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SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS AND
RULE 10b-5: LEGAL STANDARDS,
INDUSTRY PRACTICES,
PREVENTATIVE GUIDELINES AND
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
LEWIS D. SOLOMON*
DAN WILKE"
I. INTRODUCTION
A MID the pervasive gloom on Wall Street, stemming from the
prolonged and severe decline in securities prices and the resulting
impoverishment of the brokerage industry, securities professionals and
particularly security analysts, face a multitude of perplexing questions
under rule 10b-5,1 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission pursuant to section 10(b)2 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. The industry gropes for practical guidelines relating to inside
and market impact information. Application of the rule to securities
professionals has, thus far, rested on retrospective, ad hoc interpreta-
tions by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the courts. The
continued expansion of rule 10b-5, under the rationale of promoting its
intended remedial purpose, has been greeted with a rending of gar-
ments and a gnashing of teeth by the brokerage industry.
Promised elucidation of rule 10b-5 by the Commission has not been
forthcoming. 3 In light of the devastating liability exposure of securities
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City, School of Law. Professor
Solomon received his A.B. degree from Cornell University, and his LL.B. from Yale University
Law School.
** B.A., J.D., University of Missouri-Kansas City.
1. The text of rule lob-5 is as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
3. The Commission has elicited comments from the industry concerning clarification of the
rule. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10316 (Aug. 1, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,446; see Gillis, Inside Information: Are Guidelines Possible,
Financial Analysts J., May-June, 1974, at 12.
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professionals the purpose of this Article is to (1) analyze current
problems encountered by securities professionals under the rule; (2)
formulate practical suggestions for attorneys and industry sources for
preventative purposes; and (3) present concrete suggestions for reform
suitable for consideration and adoption by the SEC.
In order-to gain a better insight into the business and economic
background of the world in which securities professionals (particularly
security analysts) operate and into industry practices in light of pro-
mulgated judicial and administrative standards, we conducted an
anonymous survey of one hundred randomly selected member firms of
the New York Stock Exchange during the spring of 1974.4 We
received sixteen responses to our inquiry, including three refusals to
participate in the survey and thirteen answers of varying degrees of
helpfulness. Although certainly not a statistically reliable sample, we
believe that the data present, in conjunction with personal interviews
and supplemental data, a fair representation of the industry's response
to some of the most pressing problems encountered by securities
professionals under rule 10b-5.
In following up the questionnaires, the senior author conducted in
May and June of 1974 a series of eleven focused interviews with junior
and senior security analysts, supervisory and compliance personnel,
and partners and executives in seven Wall Street brokerage firms.
These interviews, each of which lasted from one to three hours,
enabled us to understand and to evaluate brokerage industry practices,
compliance procedures and suggestions for reform. Further, we cor-
responded with, and in some instances met with, a variety of addi-
tional expert sources, including representatives of the SEC, New York
Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, Financial Analysts Fed-
eration, and New York Society of Security Analysts. These correspond-
ence and meetings produced additional data and served to cross-
check brokerage responses and perceptions.
After presenting an overview of rule 10b-5, the functions performed
by the security analyst and the methods by which the analyst fulfills
his role, this Article will focus on developing practical guidelines, in
4. The questionnaire sought to discern research methods of analysts, reasons for personal
meetings with corporate executives, industry perception of applicable legal standards (including
the definition of material nonpublic information), and industry compliance therewith, particular
procedures for dealing with inside information after its receipt, barriers erected by firms to
prevent flow of inside information between departments, and the cost of compliance with rule
10b-5. To our knowledge the only similar research in this area was an Institutional Investor
Survey performed in 1973. See note 45 infra. Institutional Investor Institute sent out an
unspecified number of questionnaires to both brokerage houses and institutions. Thirty-four
responses were received and the Institute held in-depth interviews with each of the thirty-four to
supplement the questionnaire.
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light of current industry practices, for counsel advising securities
professionals, and particularly the security analysts, under rule 10b-5.
Our research has shown that the brokerage industry displays great
sensitivity to rule 10b-5 problems and that industry procedures at-
tempt to adhere to perceived legal standards enunciated by the Com-
mission and the courts. The firms responding to our survey have
indicated that their concerns are to avoid the receipt of inside informa-
tion generated by the placement of brokerage firm representatives on
boards of directors of issuers, and the problems of tippee liability. The
unsettled and difficult questions regarding the erection of walls among
various departments within the firm and the person or entity to whom
the firm, in a conflict of interest situation, owes its ultimate fiduciary
duty, met with a wide variety of industry responses. In the absence of
authoritative legal prohibitions, the analysts widely rely on building of
mosaics, the confirmation of ultimate research conclusions with corpo-
rate management, and the utilization of sources outside the corpora-
tion to generate additional data and to verify information secured from
management. There are also several industry practices in the frontier
area of market impact.
On the agenda for reform, we recommend the adoption, where
possible, of guidelines by the Commission sanctioning established
industry practices which appear to conform with the existing rationale
of rule 10b-5 and which appear to serve the public interest. These
areas include contacts with corporations, mosaics, and verification of
conclusions. We suggest that additional study be devoted to the
appropriate standards relating to the erection of walls within a broker-
age firm and the problems of market impact. To resolve the almost
hopeless task of devising serviceable definitions of "insider" based on
the "extraordinary relationship" test and of "materiality," we suggest
that the SEC mandate continuous and prompt disclosure of all mate-
rial information by corporations and that a no-action telephone hotline
system be established to provide prospective resolution of the pressing
rule 10b-5 problems faced by securities professionals. It appears man-
ifestly unfair for the SEC to hang the sword of uncertainty over those
securities professionals who are attempting to conduct business in an
ethical and legal manner.
The movement toward the consolidation of brokerage firms - should
5. The reduced number of brokerage houses shows up most starkly at the New York Stock
Exchange. "A Big Board spokesman said the number of member firms as of [September 19741 was
514, down from 523 at the end of 1973, 558 at the end of 1972 and a peak of 681 at the end of
1961. Earlier this year, Robert H.B. Baldwin, president of the prestigious investment banking
firm of Morgan Stanley & Co. and vice-chairman of the ISecurities Industry Association],
predicted that between 100 and 200 securities firms might merge or go out of business if industry
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heighten ethical standards within the industry and render a preventa-
tive approach by the Commission the more effective. The current
crunch of Wall Street may lead firms to rid themselves of marginal
analysts perhaps less attuned to conduct business in an ethical
manner. 6 The surviving houses, especially the preeminent firms,
increasingly are run as bureaucratic institutions according to hierarchi-
cal arrangements and impersonal rules. 7 These bigger firms, Wall
Street sources indicated, are generally stronger entities with more
far-sighted management and the ability to devote more resources to
compliance procedures insuring that legal standards are met. Increased
visibility of more firms may also assist in eliminating tipping of inside
information by rendering the trading activities of the clients of these
firms more readily subject to the surveillance procedures of the New
York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange. 8
The growing trend toward professionalism 9 by security analysts
probably will also bring an increased recognition of the need to comply
conditions worsen." Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 1974, at 4, col. 2. See also id., Oct. 2, 1974, at 26, col. I
(estimates of future brokerage-firm disappearances range from 50 to 200); id., Sept. 17, 1974, at 8,
col. 2.
6. See Parker, Ethical Issues for the Financial Analyst, in Corporate Financial Reporting:
Ethical and Other Problems (Symposium) 159 (J. Burton ed. 1972); Stern & Brown, Critique, id.
at 191.
7. See M. Weber, Bureaucracy, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 196 (H. Gerth & C.
Mills eds. & transls. 1958).
8. See note 73 infra and accompanying text.
9. The security analysts are torn by a struggle over professionalism and the means of
regulating behavior. In early 1974, the New York Society of Security Analysts sponsored a
proposed draft bill that would have provided for licensing of such analysts by New York State
subject to mild qualifications for admission to the practice. See Proposed Professional Security
Analysts Draft Bill, February, 1974. Only licensed analysts could publish investment recommen-
dations. The bill was opposed by the Financial Analysts Federation, with a membership of
14,000, the majority of whom are employed by institutions. The Federation has advocated
voluntary self-regulation rather than suffer an additional level of bureaucratic control and the
probability of divergent state regulatory schemes. See Financial Analysts Federation Plan for
Professional Self-Regulation, adopted April 28, 1974, as revised May 10, 1974; Financial Analysts
Federation Report to all Member Financial Analysts from Qualifications and Licensing Commit-
tee, Re: Professional Standards of Analysts, Feb. 18, 1974. The Financial Analysts Federation
plan envisages the establishment of a board to codify standards of behavior and a national
conduct committee to punish wrongdoing. Federal regulation may also be in the wings. Garrett,
The Security Analysts and the Disclosure Rules (speech before the N.Y. Society of Security
Analysts), 171 N.Y.L.J., May 13, 1974, at 1, col. 3 (SEC chairman favors professionalization of
the analysts); Gillis, Regulation of Analysts, Financial Analysts J., Jan.-Feb., 1974, at 14;
Thomas, Analysts' Insecurity, Barron's, May 27, 1974, at 3, col. 1; BNA Sec. Regs. Rep., Feb.
13, 1974, at A-15, "Professional Groups Take Two Approaches to Regulation of Security
Analysts." For discussion on the criteria of professions, see Parsons, Professions, in 12 Ency-
clopedia of Social Sciences 536-46 (1969); Seeman, Alienation and Engagement, in The Human
Meaning of Social Change 467, 520-21 (P. Converse & A. Campbell ed. 1972).
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with legal and ethical standards. This development may also hasten
the demise of incompetent analysts who seek to rely more on tips
than on experience and expertise. A significant number of analysts, our
empirical research indicates, pride themselves on their ability to for-
mulate recommendations without taking legally proscribed shortcuts.
II. OVERVIEW OF RULE 10b-5
Section 10(b),10 when adopted, was one of the least controversial
parts of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."1 The rather unheralded
promulgation' 2 of rule lob-5' 3 by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission hardly suggested the impact the rule would have in later years.
Rule 10b-5 evolved through court and Commission action in four
stages: creation of a private remedy, broadened duty of corporate
officers, imposition of liability on insiders in connection with securities
transactions by themselves and their tippees, and finally, recognition
of the tippees as insiders and the devolution of liability upon them.
The creation of private civil liability under the rule came about
through the ingenuity of members of the bar operating in the private
sector. Soon after the initial issuance of the rule, civil suits by persons
injured as a result of violations were permitted under the theory that
the disregard of an express administrative mandate is a "wrongful act
10. See note 2 supra.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970). "It [§ 10(b)] went relatively unnoticed in the major battles
over stock exchange regulation, margin rules and broker-dealer segregation, and the less violent
struggles over manipulative pools, short-swing insider trading, registration and reporting re-
quirements for listed companies, and the creation of the SEC." 1 A. Bromberg, Securities Law
Fraud: SEC Rule 10b-5, § 2.2, at 22.2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bromberg).
12. In the words of the late Milton Freeman: "It was one day in the year 1943 [1942], I
believe. I was sitting in my office in the S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a call
from Jim Treanor who was then the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division. He said, 'I
have just been on the telephone with Paul Rowen,' who was then the S.E.C. Regional
Administrator in Boston, 'and he has told me about the president of some company in Boston
who is going around buying up the stock of his company from his own shareholders at $4.00 a
share, and he has been telling them that the company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the
earnings are going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there
anything we can do about it?' So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked at
Section 10(b) and I looked at [SA] Section 17, and I put them together, and the only discussion we
had there was where 'in connection with the purchase or sale' should be, and we decided it should
be at the end.
"We called the Commission and got on the calendar, and I don't remember whether we got
there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of paper around to all the commissioners.
All the commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody
said anything except Sumner Pike who said, 'Well,' he said, 'we are against fraud, aren't we?' "
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 793, 922 (1967); see I
Bromberg § 2.2, at 22.6; Manne, Insider Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 Gee. Wash.
L. Rev. 473, 477-78 (1967).
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974); see note 1 supra.
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and a tort.' 1 4 Although neither Congress nor the Commission foresaw
or proposed such a private remedy, the courts implied the existence of
one in the absence of an express legislative prohibition.
Rule 10b-5 was next applied to a faceless securities transaction, and
obligations were imposed on a registered representative, who was also
a corporate insider, to disclose material information not yet released to
the public, prior to trading on the issuer's securities. The "equal access
to information" doctrine permitting insiders to use material informa-
tion only if such information is publicly available was founded on the
policy of maintaining public confidence in the fairness of securities
markets. 15
Drawing on this policy, the next logical extension of liability under
the rule came about in the landmark decision SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co. 16 In addition to attempting to resolve questions of materi-
ality, adequacy of corporate disclosure, and when insiders may trade
after public disclosure, the Second Circuit precluded insiders (tippors)
from passing material nonpublic information to corporate outsiders
(their tippees) and subjected inside tippors to liability for damages
resulting from the trading activities of their respective tippees.
Moreover, the dicta in Texas Gulf Sulphur has provided the rationale
for the subsequent imposition of liability on other tippees. 17
The ensuing years have witnessed a proliferation of litigation under
rule 10b-5 and the spinning of a vast web of confused and often
contradictory doctrine in various areas such as standing to sue,18
14. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
15. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). In this proceeding the SEC rejected as a
defense the common law distinction that officers and executives owe duties only to the corpora-
tion itself, not to the shareholders of the corporation. Id. at 913-14. In commenting on the Wall
Street reaction to the Cady, Roberts decision, Brooks states: "But so firmly entrenched was the
Wall Street tradition of taking unfair advantage of the larger investing public, and so lax tile
S.E.C.'s administration of that particular part of the law between 1942 and 1961, that not a
single stockbroker had ever been prosecuted for improper use of privileged information during
those two decades. In the tarpaper shack, 10b-5 had simply been considered too hot to handle. It
was the law in name only . . . . [Following the Cady, Roberts decision, it was thought that]
[p]resumably the agency would pursue the new policy in the future .... [Criticism resulted from
the street] [blut soon the grumbling died down, and the Stock Exchange turned around and
issued a strong set of new directives to its members against the use of inside information by
brokers." J. Brooks, The Go-Go Years 86-87 (1973).
16. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
17. Id. at 852-53.
18. See 2 Bromberg § 8.8, at 221. The cases progressed beginning with Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), enunciating the
purchaser-seller doctrine, through modification in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), to Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974), (noted in 42 Fordham L. Rev. 688 (1974)), rejecting the
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materiality, 19 scienter, 20 reliance,2 ' causation-- and tippee liability.23
The brokerage industry has watched with growing alarm the possible
(and inevitable) extension of liability in the tippee situation. The
holding in Investors Management Co. 24 and the ensuing cases and
releases25 completed the evolution of rule 10b-5 concerning securities
distinction altogether. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Manor Drug Stores v. Blue
Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3273 (U.S. Nov. 11,
1974) (No. 74-124). Their decision may help resolve some of the confusion regarding the
purchaser-seller requirement. See also Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23
Ala. L. Rev. 543 (1971); Comment, The Birnbaum Doctrine-An Aging Rule Reexamined by the
Courts, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 715 (1971); 1974 U. Ill. L.F. 521; 10 Duquesne L. Rev. 692 (1972).
19. 2 Bromberg § 8.3; see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849, 851 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (the reasonable investor test, the market impact
test, the "hang yourself test"). For other definitional variations see Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir.
1970); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971);
Investors Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July 29, 1971),
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 78,163. See also Brodsky, Inside
Information-Materiality, 169 N.Y.L.J., June 6, 1973, at 1, col. 1; Kripke, Rule 1ob-5 Liability
and "Material" "Facts", 46 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1061 (1971). See generally Brodsky, Inside
Information-Materiality, 169 N.Y.L.J., June 6, 1973, at 1, col. 1; Part VB infra.
20. 2 Bromberg § 8.4, at 203; see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (relaxing rule requiring scienter). See also
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973), noted in 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1066 (1974);
Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971) (indicating that an
allegation of negligence alone is insufficient). For recent commentary see generally Epstein, The
Scienter Requirement in Actions under Rule 10b-5, 48 N.C.L. Rev. 482 (1970); Note, The Role of
Scienter and the Need to Limit Damages in Rule lob-5 Actions-The Texas Gulf Sulphur
Litigation, 59 Ky. L.J. 891 (1971).
21. 2 Bromberg § 8.6, at 209. Recent commentary includes Cobine, Elements of Liability and
Actual Damages in Rule 10b-5 Actions, 1972 U. Ill. L.F. 651, 656-67; Dykstra, The Battle
Grounds of 10(b)-5, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 297, 305-06; Comment, Reliance Under Rule lob-5: Is the
"Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 562 (1972). See also Note, The Reliance
Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 584 (1975).
22. 2 Bromberg § 8.7, at 213. See generally Bradford, Rule 10b-5: The Search for a Limiting
Doctrine, 19 Buffalo L. Rev. 205 (1970); Cobine, Elements of Liability and Actual Damages in
Rule 10b-5 Actions, 1972 U. Ill. L.F. 651, 656-67.
23. 1 Bromberg § 7.5(4), at 190.11; Glickman, "Tippee" Liability Under Section 10tb) and
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 20 U. Kan. L. Rev. 47 (1971); Rapp & Loeb,
Tippee Liability and Rule 10b-5, 1971 U. Ill. L.F. 55; Note, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc.: The Tippee of the Rule 10b-5 Iceberg, 5 Rutgers Camden L.J. 256 (1974);
see note 25 infra.
24. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July 29, 1971), [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 78,163.
25. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); see
SEC v. Avis, Inc., Civil No. 1065 (S.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 7, 1974); Faberge, Inc., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 10174 (May 25, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sic. L. Rep.
79,378; Bernstein, Disclose or Abstain, 171 N.Y.L.J., Apr. 22, 1974, at 1, col. 1. For
background on Faberge and related proceedings see Dorfman, Heard on the Street, Wall St. J.,
May 2, 1973, at 43, col. 3; id., June 11, 1974, at 2, col. 2. For background on SEC v. Avis, supra,
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professionals and inside information, by extending liability to tippees
who trade on material nonpublic information. In addition, the now
celebrated Equity Funding scandal has spawned an abundance of
cases, only recently consolidated for pre-trial proceedings, which may
enable courts confronted by a difficult factual situation to unfold
further doctrinal developments .of interest to the securities
professionals. 26
III. THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY ANALYST
IN THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM
Research departments in many brokerage houses, after World War
II, were little more than window dressing. The emergence of a highly
see Wall St. J., Mar. 8, 1974, at 13, col. 3; id., June 7, 1973, at 6, col. 3. See also SEC v. Liggett
& Meyers, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,204 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Roberts,
Scott & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11013 (Sept. 17, 1974); Reynolds & Co.,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10835 (May 31, 1974), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,811 (SEC administratively censured three broker-dealers). For back-
ground on SEC v. Liggett & Meyers, supra, see Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1973, at 19, col. 1. See also
SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (SEC obtained an injunction
against a registered representative, but not against the brokerage firm since the firm had
established and implemented adequate supervisory procedures); SEC v. Lum's Inc., 365 F. Supp.
1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See generally SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974) (corporate
"marriage brokers"); SEC v. Celanese Corp., SEC Lit. Release No. 6440 (July 18, 1974) (SEC
obtained consent injunction); SEC v. F.L. Salomon & Co., 73 Civ. 3926 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(complaint noted in [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,146); SEC v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., Civil No. 2458 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1973) (alleging withdrawal of recommendation
by brokerage firm after receipt of materially adverse information; the withdrawal of the
recommendation deemed equivalent to actual disclosure of information to customer); Hawk
Indus., Inc. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Brodsky, Liability of
Brokerage Firms for Acts of Their Employees, 170 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 5, 1973, at 1, col. 1; Gillis,
Bausch & Lomb and Analytic Judgment, Financial Analyst J., May-June 1972, at 10; Wall St. J.,
June 25, 1973, at 2, col. 2; id., Apr. 3, 1974, at 4, col. 2 (Geon Industries case noted). All of these
proceedings were brought by the SEC to enjoin selective dissemination of material nonpublic
information to brokerage firms and, ultimately, to their clients.
26. For a compendium of Equity Funding background sources to date of publication, see
Herman, Equity Funding, Inside Information, and the Regulators, 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. I nn. I
& 2 (1973). See also R. Dirks & L. Gross, The Great Wall Street Scandal (1973); DeMott, Inside
Information: The Equity Funding aftermath, Institutional Investor, July, 1973, at 33; GIllis,
Equity Funding, Financial Analysts J., July-Aug. 1973, at 8; Goldstein, A Law Professor's
Dream, Wall St. J., May 14, 1973, at 30, col. 1; Robertson, Those Daring Young Con Men of
Equity Funding, Fortune, Aug. 1973, at 50; Rosenfeld, What Not To Do With Inside Informa-
tion, 169 N.Y.L.J., June 29, 1973, at 1, col. 1; Seidler, Financial Controls Crooks Have the
Edge, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1974, § 3 (Business), at 14, col. 3. See also Equity Funding Corp.
Securities Litigation, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,456 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (consolidation order for pre-trial proceedings); SEC v. Equity Funding Corp., [1973
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,917 (C.D. Cal. 1973). The Herman article and the
Goldstein article both anticipate intriguing legal problems arising with respect to such matters as
insider definitions and materiality of rumors.
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profitable institutional business, flowing from ever greater domination
of the stock market by institutional investors, such as bank trust
departments and insurance companies, 27 propelled virtuoso security
analysts to positions of power and wealth within particular brokerage
firms and on Wall Street generally. 28 In contrast to the flourishing days
of the 1960s, the current beleaguered state of the stock market and the
resulting impoverishment of the brokerage business (stemming also
from negotiated commission rates) has forced man) analysts to leave
the field or to pursue their trade by working for the institutional
investors. 29
The security analyst currently fulfills three separate functions: (1)
descriptive, (2) selective, and (3) critical. 30 Descriptive analysis is
limited to the collection of important facts relating to a corporation
encompassing the development of new information and the transfor-
mation of existing data into a meaningful form for presentation.
Advising a brokerage client whether to purchase, sell or hold a given
issue-in effect passing judgment on the merits of one stock as against
another-is the essence of the analyst's selective role. In performing
the function of critic, the analyst may pressure corporations to curb
abuses-e.g., the accounting methods which inaccurately reflect
financial developments-by threatening to withhold a favorable
recommendation.31
In order to perform his functions the analyst focuses on assessing
and projecting the financial position and earnings picture of a corpora-
tion, especially estimating the stock market's appraisal of the future
value of corporate earnings. Three major theories presently exist as to
the appropriate manner for the prediction of the future price behavior
of a security-fundamental, technical and psychological.
The method analysts most widely employ is the evaluation of the
so-called fundamentals of a corporation or an industry.32 This tech-
27. See Solomon, Institutional Investors: Stock Market Impact and Corporate Control, 42
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 761 (1974).
28. Thomas, Analysts' Insecurity, Barron's, Ma) 27, 1974, at 3, col. 1. The development of
the importance and prestige of the security analyst roughly paralleled the increasing torrent of
corporate reports and disclosure which supply much of the raw materials for research. Sec B.
Graham, D. Dodd & S. Cottle, Security Analysis 24 (4th ed. 1962).
29. Analysts who work for brokerage firms are called "sell" side analysts; those employed by
institutional investors are called "buy" side analysts.
30. B. Graham, D. Dodd & S. Cottle, Security Analysis 25-35 (4th ed. 1962).
31. Id. at 34-35. The analyst's critical function in theory facilitates the development of a
"fairer" securities market.
32. The "intrinsic value" theory is an excellent example of the fundamentalist school of
thought. The analyst compares certain measures of corporate worth-e.g., book value--with the
current market price of the issue. If the analyst finds the market value less than the intrinsic
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nique focuses on a dissection of current and projected financial statis-
tics which, analysts believe, provide the key to predicting future
securities prices.
The technical analysis, on the other hand, differs markedly from the
fundamental approach. The adherents to the technical theory, armed
with graphs, charts and more recently with computer print-outs, posit
that historic price and/or volume patterns for a corporation, an indus-
try, or the entire stock market, provide the best clue as to the future
price behavior. 33 Corporate assets, financial soundness, earnings
trends, and other indicia of value, so assiduously assessed by funda-
mental analysts, are ignored by the technically oriented analyst.
Some theoreticians and a limited number of practicing analysts have
espoused a psychological theory which rests on the premise that the
value of stock can only be the amount that someone else will pay for
it.34 Rather than evaluating the corporation's financial position or past
market performance, the analyst pays attention to stock fads in the
hope of getting on and off the investment bandwagon at the appro-
priate time.
Recently, security analysts and the methods they employ have come
under increasing criticism which has questioned the predictability of
securities prices, the consistency with which recommendations prove
profitable, and ultimately, the economic function performed by
analysts. Specifically, the "random walk" hypothesis, that "prices have
no memory and yesterday has nothing to do with tomorrow" '35 asks
whether an analyst's recommendations, over the long-term, will prove
more profitable than the random selection of stocks. 36 Practicing
value, he has uncovered a bargain. The market price of such security, it is believed, will rise
eventually to the "intrinsic value," resulting in gain to those who buy the stock. Conversely, if the
market price exceeds the "intrinsic value," the stock should be sold. Cf. R. Badger & P. Coffman,
The Complete Guide to Investment Analysis 202-19 (1967); B. Graham, D. Dodd & S. Cottle,
Security Analysis 405-15 (4th ed. 1962); H. Levy & M. Sarnat, Investment and Portfolio Analysis
131-78 (1972). See also Moskowitz, The 'Intelligent Investor' at 80, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1974,
§ 3, at 7, col. 1; Barron's, Sept. 23, 1974, at 7, col. 1.
33. See Schulz, Technician's Perspective, Forbes, May 1, 1974, at 54 (proponent of technical
analytical viewpoint).
34. The assumption made by the psychological theory is that it is perfectly all right to pay
twice the issue's intrinsic value if at some later time an individual can be found who will pay four
times what the stock is worth. "All the smart investor has to do is beat the gun-get in at the very
beginning. This theory might less charitably be called the 'greater-fool theory'." B. Malkiel, A
Random Walk Down Wall Street 24 (1973). See also J. Keynes, The General Theory of
Employment, Interest and Money (1965); G. Le Bon, The Crowd (1908); A. Smith, The Money
Game (1968).
35. A. Smith, The Money Game 147-68 (1968).
36. "The theorists say that changes in market prices of securities are like a random walk, Just
as a man may turn first in one direction and then in another while walking about with no
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analysts are, of course, not oblivious to the "random walk" hypothesis.
All analysts interviewed exuded self-confidence combined with a firm
belief that skillful analysis leads to more accurate recommendations.
The analyst feels that he can achieve superior results over the
long-term.37 It is, however, impossible for all analysts to out-perform
the stock market and for this reason there is some validity in the
"random walk" hypothesis.38
With the small public investor vanishing from the stock market,39
institutional investors are currently the main customers for the high
octane information generated by security analysts. Several astute Wall
Street observers noted, in the course of our interviews, that institu-
tional investors look to sell-side (brokerage) analysts to perform the
descriptive function-that is, to provide information and put de-
velopments in perspective-and place decreasing importance on the
stock selection service provided by the analyst. This is a key develop-
ment in terms of assessing the economic function of the security
analyst. Rather than accepting the "random walk" hypothesis and the
gloomy conclusions regarding the value of investment analysis, the
analyst can emphasize his descriptive role and leave the choice of
stocks to the institutional investors and the ever greater number of
in-house analysts employed by such enterprises. 40
particular object in mind, so do stock prices change upward and downward in such manner that
the sequence of upturns and downturns cannot be predicted from past price changes They say
that the direction of change from one day to another, or from one month to another, is no more
predictable than the direction of change in a series of cumulated random numbers." H. Sauvain.
Investment Management 165 (4th ed. 1973). See also R. Cootner, The Random Character of
Stock Market Prices (1967); B. Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street (1973); A. Smith.
The Money Game 148 (1968); Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. Bus. U. Chi. 34
(1965).
37. While the theory is that price fluctuations have no relation to informational flow and
investigation will be of no substantial assistance in selecting stocks, one firm interviewed had
performed research indicating that 70% of price fluctuations were the result of random market
activity but that the other 30% was the direct result of corporate developmenL,. These results
bolster the philosophy that intensive investigation increases the probability of successful advice.
38. "It is already notorious that the performances of professional money managers exhibit a
more and more normal probability distribution. About half of them do better than the averages
and about half do worse; and only a small minority perform consistently well over a period of
years-probably by chance." Spigelman & Gumperz, New Challenge for Investors: Coping with
the Knowledge Revolution, Financial Analysts J., July-Aug. 1972. at 22, 32. See also I. Friend,
M. Blume & J. Crockett, Mutual Funds and Other Institutional Investors: A New Perspective
(1970); Friend & Vickers, Portfolio Selection and Investment Performance, 20 J. Finance 391
(1965); Thomas, Divide and Multiply, Barron's, Nov. 5, 1973, at 5, col. I ("at least half the
pension funds do worse than the general stock market averages"). The inability to out-perform
the market may lead security analysts to seek material nonpublic information to increase their
odds of success.
39. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
40. The decline in brokerage business forced a number of highly productive analysts to turn
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
IV. How THE SECURITY ANALYST FULFILLS
His FUNCTION
The security analyst daily walks a tightwire with respect to rule
10b-5. Despite the advent of the concept of equal access to information
for all stock market investors, 4' the analyst, using fundamental
methods, attempts to garner slightly more than equal access to im-
prove his performance and provide a greater than equal footing for his
clients. The sell-side analyst spends a large portion of his time 42
generating the information necessary to build and refine a model of a
corporation by gaining an understanding of the factors which affect,
from a fundamentalist viewpoint, the company's earnings and
financial position.
The analyst begins first by researching public sources, which include
corporate data sent to shareholders, annual or quarterly reports,
newspaper and trade publications, and material filed with various
public regulatory bodies, especially the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Concurrently, or shortly following his review of public
sources, the analyst turns to personal meetings and telephone calls
with corporate executives. Personal contact allows the analyst to
become better acquainted with management and its operation of the
corporation, thus enhancing his perception and ability to evaluate the
corporation. 43
to employment with institutional investors in the hope of greater job security, a more leisurely
pace, and freedom from merchandising headaches. Thomas, Analysts' Insecurity, Barron's, May
27, 1974, at 3, col. 3. By employing these analysts institutions are able to pick their own
investments. Connelly, The Growing Importance of In-House Research, Institutional Investor,
Oct. 1974, at 69; Jansson, There are top analysts at institutions, too. Institutional Investor, Nov.
1973, at 53. More and more leading analysts are branching out on their own, finding themselves
in a better position to capitalize on their own talents, and receiving greater financial remuneration
than when laboring for a brokerage firm. Dorfman, The rise of the entrepreneurial analyst,
Institutional Investor, July 1974, at 43.
41. See note 103 infra.
42. Meetings with institutional clients either alone or with a member of the house's institu-
tional sales force are referred to in the industry as the "road show." One interviewee estimated
that 20-25% of that firm's analysts' time was spent on these promotion tours.
43. Seven of the eleven brokerage firms responding on this point indicated that analysts'
meetings with corporations constitute an invaluable research tool-indeed, the most valuable.
The SEC has also recognized the value of analysts' meetings with corporations. "We also
recognize that discussions between corporate management and groups of analysts which provide
a forum for filling interstices in analysis, for forming a direct impression of the quality of
management, or for testing the meaning of public information, may be of value." SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July 29, 1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 78,103 at 80,521. In these meetings the analysts were known to seek information not
available from public documents or other written sources. Concern was expressed as to the legal
liability associated with deficient bases for reports disseminated to clients. To insure their
The analyst, however, does not limit his research to the review of
written information and contacts with corporate officers. He also
checks sources external to the corporation, such as customers, sup-
pliers, wholesale and retail distributors, and even industry com-
petitors. These sources provide additional data and a means of cross-
checking information supplied by the corporation."
Although stressing the need for personal contacts with corporate
officials and sources outside the enterprise, brokerage firms manifest a
surprising indifference to the development of written or oral policy
guidelines regarding the format of these encounters. 45 Apart from the
amorphous mandates of rule 10b-5, which are interwoven into operat-
ing rules and compliance procedures, 46 the firms in our sample adhere
to two basic propositions: that restrictions on format are impractical,
and that analysts are professionals who should be allowed maximum
flexibility to glean and develop "legally" permissible information. The
brokerage industry thus relies on the standards generated by corpora-
tions for their own protection with reference to modes of contact
between issuers and security analysts.
The disclosure concepts developed under rule 10b-5 and the listing
requirements of the New York and American Stock Exchanges in-
creasingly have led corporations to maintain an "open door" policy in
their relations with shareholders, security analysts, the press and
others who have a legitimate interest in corporate news. 4 7 This policy
stems from a desire to equalize the access to information and to avoid
continued "peace of mind" and higher standards of accuracy, the analysts cross-check their
conclusions by confirmation with the issuer. See Part VD infra.
44. For instance, following the chain of distribution from wholesaler to retailer helps the
analyst evaluate product sales and market penetration. Corporate suppliers may assist the analyst
in assessing the corporation's abilities to meet production schedules and deadlines.
45. Institutional Investor Systems, Inc., How Major Institutions Deal with the Problem of
"Inside Information," A Confidential Report 9 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Institutional Survey].
This report inquired into the frequency with which a number of institutional investors and
brokerage firms had set policies for handling the receipt and use of inside information. Only 12%
of those responding had no policy, 30% had some unwritten rules (14% some well-defined rules,
16% all well-defined rules), and 58% had written rules. Our response revealed that II of the 13
firms had written policies, and the two without written policies believed the unwritten policies of
the firm to be well-defined. Twelve of the 13 firms indicated the absence, in their compliance
policies, of any guidelines regarding the format of meetings and other personal contacts.
46. Securities professionals were chagrined at their inability to understand clearly the
intricacies and application of the rule.
47. See Advertising Dep't, NYSE, Guidelines for Member Firm Communications with the
Public (March 1970); AMEX Company Guide, 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 23,124B (1970);
NYSE Company Manual A-20, 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 23,123 (1971); Letters from Edwin B.
Peterson, Jr., Sen. Vice Pres., Compliance & Regulatory Securities Div., AMEX, to Lewis D.
Solomon, Apr. 25, 1974 and Aug. 1, 1974.
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the appearance of partiality in the dissemination of data. Many
corporations, especially those lacking significant institutional support,
recognize that the work product of the analyst, especially a favorable
report, may assist the corporation in many ways, including the genera-
tion of institutional interest in the issue, thereby providing a new
source of purchasers. In short, corporations, prodded along by the
Securities and Exchange Commission or by their own self-interest,
recognize the need for good rapport with security analysts.
Corporations manifest the following three patterns in dealing with
securities analysts: (1) refusing any personal contacts with analysts; (2)
conducting group meetings with analysts in the presence of the press or
followed by a press release at the conclusion of the meeting; or (3)
conducting individual meetings with analysts through various corpo-
rate officials or designated company spokesmen. In the course of our
research, securities professionals indicated that the extension of rule
10b-5 liability generally has not caused corporate officials to be more
circumspect in their dealings with analysts. 48 Although the analysts
have noted a slight trend toward more group meetings as a means of
communicating the corporation's viewpoint while lessening the liability
potential under rule 10b-5, the fact remains that most companies
continue to meet with analysts on an individual basis. In addition, an
interesting paradox regarding disclosure practices may be developing
due to the heightened sensitivity of corporations to potential liability
under rule 10b-5. Understandably, executives now proceed with more
caution, especially with regard to questions which may elicit material
nonpublic information. Several analysts in our sample suggested that
some managements have used the cloak of "inside information" as the
basis for refusing to answer legitimate inquiries, much in the same
manner as federal officials have hidden behind the mantle of "national
security." Disclosure, if it occurs at all, is restricted to quarterly
statements in the form of communications to shareholders and the
48. While the reluctance to grant personal interviews or take telephone inquiries varies from
firm to firm, only two of the 13 houses indicated that the trend toward group sessions curtailed
the houses' ability to schedule private meetings. Contrast this with the decision of management at
Coca-Cola Co. to close its doors to analysts altogether. Elia, Heard on the Street, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 3, 1974, at 33, col. 3; Elia, Heard on the Street, id., Dec. 3, 1974, at 45, col. 4 (Coca-Cola
will "communicate with or comment to reporters only in the form of press releases"). The
presence of the press at group meetings was not greatly desired by the analysts. One respondent
reasoned that, with occasional exceptions, members of the press are not prepared and ask
elementary and time wasting questions. See also American Soc'y of Corp. Secretaries Release,
Suggested Guidelines for Dealing with Financial Analysts and the Investment Community (Mar.
12, 1969); Address by Comm'r Richard B. Smith, U. Chi. Grad. School of Bus., May 8, 1969;
Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
[Vol. 43
1975] RULE 10b-5
filing of form 10-K.4 9 Reticent corporations may thus employ rule
10b-5 to slow the flow of information to investors.
V. ADVISING SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS UNDER RULE 10b-5:
INDUSTRY PRACTICES, COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES, AND
PREVENTATIVE GUIDELINES
In this section we propose to analyze legal standards and current
industry practices in the following areas: (1) conflicts of interest; (2)
prohibitions on the use of material nonpublic information; (3) use of
the mosaic; (4) confirmation; (5) information barriers between depart-
ments; and (6) market impact, and propose practical guidelines for use
by counsel and industry sources desirous of avoiding liability under
rule 10b-5. The preeminent firms within the industry do attempt to
adhere to the legal standards regarding conflicts of interest and the
prohibition on the use of material nonpublic information. In the
absence of definitive guidelines, analysts rely upon building mosaics,
seeking out external sources of information and confirming conclusions
with corporate management. Firms differ on erecting walls and gener-
ally conduct operations without regard to market impact problems.
A. Conflicts of Interest: Problems Encountered if
Member or Officer of Brokerage Firm Serves on
the Board of Directors of an Issuer.
Brokerage firms no longer may use interlocking positions5" as a
means of obtaining preferred access to material nonpublic matters.5 1
49. The Commission believes that analysts are gratified by the already promulgated improved
continuous disclosure requirements for corporations. Garrett, The Security Analysts and Disclo-
sure Rules, 171 N.Y.L.J., May 13, 1974, at 1, col. 3. Self-congratulations are in order for what
has already been done, but further action is still needed. See text accompanying notes 100-08
infra. In contrast, analysts have been accused of less than complete candor on occasion.
particularly with brokerage clientele. Presumably when an analyst develops data indicating that a
once promising investment is no longer desirable, the analyst may merely soften his recommenda-
tion rather than change it from buy to sell. Whether or not such an indictment is accurate, it is
true that the analyst relies on corporate assistance for information. Analysts may not make too
many unfavorable reports for fear that they will be stigmatized by corporations as too critical or
negative. In this way, analysts sacrifice integrity for continued good rapport. Several analysts
indicated that as a result of this avoidance of negative judgments, Wall Street has devised an
elaborate code indicating a "sell" label, recognizable to knowledgeable professionals.
50. By means of an interlocking position a firm is linked to an issuer by placing an employee
or partner of the firm on the board of directors of the issuer. At one time this was part of the Wall
Street "who do you know" game whereby firms were recognized on the basis of the quality of
their inside contacts.
51. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911-13 (1961) (indicating that neither a firm nor its
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The duty imposed on a firm member, serving as an outside director, to
convey material information to the house's sales force which is recom-
mending the issuer's securities raises additional legal difficulties.5 2 In
order to comply with existing legal standards, explicit policy guidelines
prohibiting members or officers from serving as directors of other
corporations, have been promulgated by the firms surveyed. In those
occasional instances where firm members do occupy directorships, they
are well aware of the risks and consequences of passing along inside
information to the firm's clients or salesmen.53 Increasingly, the practi-
cal day-to-day problems encountered by securities professionals in-
volve questions of obtaining and using material nonpublic information
by firm members or analysts who do not serve as directors of other
corporations, but who gain such information from corporate insiders.
This raises the possibility of tippee liability.
B. Prohibitions on the Use of Material Nonpublic
Information in Tippee Context
1. Material Information
Securities professionals may not trade on or pass along to brokerage
clients material nonpublic information.5 4 If detected, it results in
employees may engage in transactions with the public, for individual, firm or discretionary
accounts, on the basis of material nonpublic data acquired in interlocking positions).
52. Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1st Dist.
1968) (common law recovery where registered representative was director of an issuer and failed
to supply material, adverse information in recommending a security to his clients); see text
accompanying notes 88-89 infra (ultimate fiduciary duty of the firms).
53. See generally Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1305-06 (2d Cir. 1973) (negligence
standard was insufficient to subject an outside director to liability under rule lob-5; willful or
reckless conduct needed); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (underwriters and outside directors, among others, liable under § 11 of the Securities Act of
1933 for a failure to sustain due diligence defenses); Bernstein, The "Outsider" Director and Rule
10b-5, 170 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 26, 1973, at 1, col. 1; Conti, Boardroom Blues, Wall St. J., Sept. 17,
1974, at 1, col. 6.
Forces drawing the leading partners of financial institutions and brokerage firms to director-
ships of the issuers are the prestige of identification with well-known companies, executives, and
other directors, and the opportunity to learn something of value. M. Mace, Directors: Myth and
Reality 101 (1971). In firms where members or officers sit on boards of corporations, policies
should be instituted requiring such persons to obtain prior approval of senior partners or officers
of the firm, not connected with the issuer, before executing any transactions in the issuer's
securities. One firm indicated that it placed no restraints on those members seeking to serve as
directors, but did supervise recommendations to prospective customers so that no comment was
permitted on the shares of interlocked issuers for fear of inside information flowing unchecked.
54. See generally Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1974); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Faberge, Inc., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10174 (May 25, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
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far-reaching liability consequences. The firms in our sample firmly
insisted in both questionnaires and interviews that their security
analysts do not seek material nonpublic information.-- In fact, several
analysts holding supervisory positions in research departments, stated
that the acquisition of inside information serves only to tie the hands of
a brokerage house. 56 The major difficulty with inside information is
determining when and how inside information becomes material inside
information.
Although the decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. contains
three separate tests of materiality,5 7 the working concepts of material-
Sec. L. Rep. 79,378; Investors Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
9267 (July 29, 1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 78,163;
Note, Rule 10b-5: The Effect of the Insider Trading Decisions on the Security Analyst, 54 Minn.
L. Rev. 147 (1969).
55. In contrast, one interviewee noted that prior to the decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). analysts
were often employed solely to "get the story" on a specific corporation. Many analysts considered
it routine to solicit tips regarding significant nonpublic items.
56. Institutional Survey, supra note 45, at 6. ("As for brokerage firms, they were given a
rather special, lonely position by the institutions as we worked on this study. To wit, they were
made the scapegoat, with a number of institutions saying that most tips emanate from Wall Street
and that receiving them has the effect of tying the institution's hands, so the tips do more harm
than good.").
57. The court in Texas Gulf Sulphur recognized three tests: (1) The reasonable investor
test-"whether a reasonable man would attach importance . . . in determining his choice of
action in the transaction in question." 401 F.2d at 849 (emphasis omitted). (2) The market impact
test-encompassing "any fact ... which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect
the value of the corporation's stock or securities." Id. (emphasis omitted). (3) The "hang yourself"
test-where a major factor in determining the existence of materiality focused on "the importance
attached to the drilling results [in this case] by those who knew about it" and traded on the
information. Id. at 851. See Bromberg, Corporate Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its
Implications, 22 Sw. L.J. 731, 740-42 (1978). The materiality definitions relied on by the courts
stem from common law sources. See Restatement of Torts § 538(2)(a) (1938). The reasonable man
test as applied to securities fraud, became the reasonable investor, List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 382 U.S. 811 (1965), and later the average prudent
speculator. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849-50.
The Supreme Court, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972),
indicated that the reasonable investor test did not require that the facts, to be material, would
have motivated action but only that they be such that a reasonable investor might have
considered them important in making his investment decision. See Comment, Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States-The Supreme Court Speaks on Rule 10b-5, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 119.
The SEC's definition of materiality was stated in Investors Management Co., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July 29, 1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder], CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 78,163 at 80,521 ("It was of such importance that it could be expected to affect the
judgment of investors whether to buy, sell, or hold [the] stock, and if generally known-to affect
materially the market price of the stock."). See also SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.
1974); Felt v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 569 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); 2
Bromberg § 7.4(3)(h); The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 268 (1972).
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ity currently utilized by brokerage firms focus on the "reasonable
investor" standard. Three out of four firms surveyed cited the "reason-
able investor" test. Only one quarter relied on the "market impact"
definition of materiality.58
Although most firms, by now, have developed a definition of
materiality,5 9 the analyst needs to know in concrete terms what types
of information have been and are likely to be held material. The
compliance department of one firm compiled the following memoran-
dum of the types of information which it felt a court or the Commis-
sion might deem material: 60
Dividend increases or decreases, earnings estimates, changes in previously released
earnings estimates, significant expansion or curtailment of operations, a significant
increase or decline of order, significant merger or aqquisition proposals or agreements,
significant new products or discoveries, extraordinary borrowing, major litigation,
liquidity problems, extraordinary management developments, purchase or sale of
substantial assets.
The above list should not be considered exhaustive, but only an aid in recognizing
the most common situations that may arise.
Although it is helpful to the analyst, the list does not resolve
lingering uncertainties. For example, if a corporation corrects and
lowers its announced earnings from one dollar to sixty cents per share,
is this material in and of itself? What if the correction was only ten or
twenty cents per share? What if the analyst learns through corporate
sources that a previously profitable blue-chip corporation will register
a minimal quarterly loss due to the acquisition of equipment for
expansion? 6' Can the analyst who receives this information know how
the reasonable investor would react in a trading situation? Experi-
enced Wall Street hands, cognizant of the severe price declines regis-
tered in 1974 by previously high-flying glamour stocks, advise that
58. This test is not favored by analysts because it disregards causality and depends only on
hindsight. See Jennings & Smith, Insider Trading and the Analyst, Fifth Annual Institute on
Securities Regulation 261, 280 (1974).
59. Only two of the firms indicated that no definition of materiality had been formulated.
According to one respondent, since material inside information is difficult enough for tile
attorneys to define, the analyst cannot be expected to do so. In one firm, supervisory personnel
had responsibility for empirically defining materiality by reviewing contacts between its analysts
and outside sources. Most firms leave the initial determination regarding material nonpublic
information to the security analyst. Only if he perceives a problem are procedures set in motion
for intra-firm review.
60. The list is adapted from 3A H. Bloomenthal, Securities and Federal Corporate Law
§ 9.13 (1974).
61. See Faberge Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10174 (May 25, 1973), 11973
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,378 (covert disclosure by corporate officer to
broker-dealer of material information which inherently influenced investors and the market; and
was misused by broker-dealers and investment advisors in violation of rule lob-5).
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almost any hard figures relating to earnings, if provided by corporate
insiders, are very likely to be considered material. 6
2
To date, litigation has generally concerned instances where, it is
believed, reasonable minds would agree that the information was
material. 63 What troubles the brokerage industry is that the Securities
and Exchange Commission may, in the future, attempt to broaden the
definition of materiality to encompass certain "gray areas." If it does,
those firms merely complying with current legal standards will be
exposed to potential liability in private damage actions.
Verifiable information is a realistic point of focus for the courts and
the Commission for preventing securities fraud. However, the Equity
Funding proceedings, particularly the New York Stock Exchange
charges against Raymond Dirks, 64 focus on the question of whether a
rumor could ever be shown to be material nonpublic information. The
term rumor suggests unverifiability and it can be argued that even if a
rumor has just as fraudulent an effect as any other tip, when the lines
of communication are so attenuated between the insider (or other
person who propounds the rumor), 6 - and the person who hears the
rumor, 66 the reasonable investor should not take the rumor seriously.
Wall Street sources questioned provided alternative means of han-
dling rumors. Several analysts indicated that a rumor, even if mater-
ial, may be treated as public information and employed in their
recommendations. The theory is that if a recommendation can be
justified by other research performed by the analyst, he should act as
though the rumor had simply never come to his attention. Morally and
legally this position is unsound. It detracts from the ethical demeanor
of the analyst's profession. It also abrogates the obligation, initially
62. SEC v. Avis, Inc., Civil No. 1065 (S.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 7, 1974). Another potentially
difficult area is management changes. What happens if the analyst learns that the chief executive
position in a corporation will pass to an experienced manager whose credentials include -itting on
the boards of several companies which have experienced forced liquidation? If tne analyst
received notice of the appointment and the appointee's past performance record, all analysts
questioned believed this information to be material.
63. See generally 2 Bromberg § 7.4; Herman, Equity Funding, Inside Information, and the
Regulators, 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1 (1973); Jacobs, What is a Misleading Statement or Omission
Under Rule 10b-5?, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 243 (1973). The problem areas are the common
materiality questions, e.g., knowledge that a corporation is thinking of discontinuing a division;
or in light of management's statement as to an earnings increase, an analyst's research reveals
that business is slower, and in response to the analyst's queries, management indicates that there
will be a slight change in forecast. The analyst may receive inside information which is
non-material at the time of receipt, but which, as circumstances change, may become material.
Seemingly, the analyst may freely use the information upon receipt.
64. See note 26 supra. See also R. Dirks & L. Gross, The Great Wall Street Scandal (1974)
65. We suggest the "rumoror."
66. We suggest the "rumoree."
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imposed upon the corporation and secondarily on -member firms under
the rules of the New York Stock Exchange, to dispell unfounded
rumors which result in unusual market activity or price variations.67 A
firm failing to adhere to this standard faces charges of aiding and
abetting corporate violations. 68
2. Nonpublic Information
Firms may freely use material matter which has been publicly
disseminated. 69 This technical distinction has not been universally
perceived. Six of the eleven firms replying directly to this question
stated that they clearly understood that, in meeting corporate officials,
analysts were to inquire only into non-material items. This response
indicates that, as a practical matter, these firms have not considered
the implications of the public-private material information distinction.
Five answers indicated that nonpublic information was a dilemma in
itself and that, as a matter of house policy, such data was never
actively solicited. Whether these statements regarding nonpublic in-
formation resulted from a misunderstanding of the federal securities
law prohibitions, or are in accord with the single response which
shunned all nonpublic information due to the difficulty of distinguish-
ing "material" from "non-material" data, is not clearly ascertainable.
Eleven of the thirteen firms surveyed stated that they had developed
policies to guide the analyst who obtains material nonpublic informa-
tion. Their policies provide that the analyst initially should advise the
firm. The firm then instructs the analyst, and anyone else in the firm to
whom he has divulged the inside information, not to pass it on to
67. NYSE Company Manual A-18 to A-24, 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 23,123 (1968).
68. 3A H. Bloomenthal, Securities and Federal Corporate Law § 9.12 (1974). See text
accompanying notes 64-67 supra for a discussion of a brokerage firm's attempts to make public
disclosure, including dispelling rumors.
69. The language of rule 10b-5 has been interpreted to limit liability where adequate public
dissemination has been made and the public has had time to absorb the information, See SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 853-54 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969). In Faberge, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10174 (May 25, 1973),
[1973 Transfer Binder], CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,378, the Commission stated: "Obviously,
what constitutes a reasonable waiting period must be dictated by such surrounding circumstances
as the form of dissemination and the complexity of the information, i.e., whether it is 'readily
translatable into investment action.' . . . Proper and adequate disclosure of significant corporate
developments can only be effected by a public release through the appropriate public media,
designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the investing public generally and without favoring
any special person or group." Id. at 83,105 (citations omitted). See also NYSE Company Manual
A-24 to A-27, 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 23,123 (1968); AMEX Company Guide §§ 401-06, 2
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 23,124 (1970). A problem arises for analysts when dealing with smaller
companies having a limited ability to obtain press coverage. Whether regional dissemination is
sufficient to satisfy the requirement for public disclosure is not yet clear. See note 100 infra.
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anyone else within or without the firm. 70 After sealing off the material
nonpublic data, the following four avenues may be pursued: (1) the
corporation may be contacted and informed that the firm believes it
has inside information and that the company should make a public
disclosure; (2) the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock
Exchange or the SEC may be contacted in order to solicit their aid in
forcing corporate disclosure; (3) the firm may publicly disclose such
information; or (4) the firm may sit on the information and refuse to
use it or pass it along to clients. Disclosure by the brokerage firms is
not favored by industry representatives because it raises the possibility
of incurring liability under rule 10b-5 or of risking libel actions if the
information should prove to be false. 7'
In addition to promulgating guidelines regarding the misuse of
material nonpublic information, the firms surveyed have taken two
other steps: they have instituted both educational programs for re-
search personnel, and review procedures. Compliance people or execu-
tives of the firms regularly meet with security analysts regarding inside
information. Memoranda are circulated by the firms' compliance de-
partments regarding significant SEC rulings and court decisions. In
addition to being routed to research departments, these memos gener-
ally go to sales, investment banking and trading areas. Moreover, the
firms have established a chain of command and encourage analysts to
discuss any problems. These programs take the form of written
guidelines. A typical hierarchical review structure might be as follows:
(1) initial review by the supervisor of the research department; (2) if
the matter cannot be resolved at this level, a partner or officer of the
firm is brought in; and (3) finally, the problem may be reviewed by a
compliance officer (who is sometimes an attorney), house counsel, or
outside counsel. 72 In sum, individuals generally within the firm are
designated as persons to whom questions pertaining to the existence
and use of material inside information should be referred. When such
70. See notes 24 & 53 supra. No case mandates insider disclosure in the absence of trading.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 850 n.12, leaves the question open. But dicta in
Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514. 519 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973), indicates that liability may be imposed for non-disclosure if a good
business reason does not exist. See Talesnick, Corporate Silence and Rule 10b-5.: Does a Publicly
Held Corporation Have an Affirmative Obligation to Disclose?, 49 Denver L.J. 369 (1973).
71. The firm also will be liable to traders in the stock who act in reliance upon materially
misleading information from the brokerage firm. See note 21 supra.
72. Rigid or formal chains of command are deemphasized in a few firms. The officers and
partners in the brokerage firms who handle compliance problems are known to the analysts, and
analysts with a rule 10b-5 problem are encouraged to consult the nearest available officer or
partner. Perhaps the best type of review would involve input from both business (supervising
analysts) and legal sides.
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inquiries are in progress, firms restrict the dissemination and utiliza-
tion of the nonpublic matter. Apparently, fear of tippee liability has
resulted in the adoption of such broad preventative and review proce-
dures.
Despite the definitional guidelines and compliance programs, when
queried whether violations of perceived standards regarding material
nonpublic information have occurred within the firm, which have not
resulted in SEC proceedings or civil litigation, interviewees and ques-
tionnaire respondents unanimously, as might be anticipated, denied
that such infractions have occurred. This comports with the consensus
that security analysts do not directly seek tips constituting inside
information. Furthermore, no firm admitted the existence of any
violations resulting in intra-firm disciplinary actions.
It should be emphasized that the brokerage sources surveyed and
interviewed represent the more prestigious segments of the industry.
These firms, under the close scrutiny of the SEC, cannot jeopardize
their preeminent positions, and the individual analysts employed by
them have no desire to risk their own professional stature. Several
very responsible Wall Street sources have indicated, however, that a
considerable number of security analysts in the smaller, less visible
firms still seek inside information. The trading activities of the clients
of these lesser known firms might well escape the surveillance proce-
dures of the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock
Exchange.7 3 Perhaps reflecting the elitist view of the larger firms,
73. See NYSE Company Manual A-18 to A-24, 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 23,123 (1968).
The stock watch of the New York Stock Exchange is designed to spot unexplained trading
patterns, including uncharacteristically large price changes for a listed stock. See Address by
Allen B. Witz, Director, Market Surveillance, NYSE, New York Society of Security Analysts,
Oct. 23, 1973, in 42 Wall St. Transcript 35,069 (Nov. 19, 1973). A similar procedure is followed
by the American Stock Exchange. Amex Stock Watchers Get to the Core of an Issue, American
Investor, Aug., 1973, at 4. The SEC has established a permanent task force as part of the
Commission's market surveillance unit to investigate cases that may involve insider trading. The
task force will work closely with the stock exchange in investigating irregular trading patterns.
Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1974, at 4, col. 2. Factors considered by the SEC Division of Enforcement in
initiating enforcement proceedings may include the size of the target firm, the nature of the
violation, and the adequacy of the enforcement staff.
A symbiotic relationship existed in the late 1960s between the over-the-counter issuers and
these smaller houses. Corporate officials were known to spend considerable time trying to
promote their stock and achieve sponsorship. The firms, on the other hand, needed choice
information from the corporate executives in order to attract clients. The collapse of the
over-the-counter market has made this type of conduct far less relevant. A resurgence of the 'hot
issue" market may again necessitate scrutiny of relationships between smaller brokerage firms
and over-the-counter companies.
The deterrent impact of SEC regulatory actions has come under attack on various fronts. See
Herman, Equity Funding, Inside Information and the Regulators, 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1, 20-26
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smaller firms generally are believed to have weaker ethical standards
as well as less compliance and preventative machinery. Wall Street
traditionally has eschewed bureaucratic structures and organizational
charts and this perhaps lends some support to the second charge.
C. Building the Mosaic: Are External Sources
of Information Deemed Insiders?
In collecting data the analyst gathers information from a variety of
sources. He strives to develop pieces of information which in and of
themselves are not material, but when taken in conjunction with other
information, and inferences flowing therefrom, permit the construction
of a so-called "mosaic."'74 The mosaic concept enables the analyst
skillfully to perform his job because he has "legally" obtained a
conclusion based on his analytical skill and experience, which, if
directly tipped to him by a corporate insider, would constitute material
nonpublic information.
The mosaic concept, widely used by security analysts, may best be
visualized by several examples. The analyst builds his mosaic by
looking to sources both internal and external to the corporation. The
analyst knows he may not ask an auto executive privately to divulge to
him earnings results or projections. Rather, the analyst asks an officer
or other corporate spokesman (an internal corporate source) to detail
the current demand for the company's products. The analyst knows
that if there exists a sales trend toward lower-priced cars, which are
less profitable per unit, the corporation's earnings will decline. He will
in this manner use his analytical judgment to accomplish indirectly
what he could not do directly.
(1973); Sargent, The SEC and the Individual Investor Restoring His Confidence in the Market,
60 Va. L. Rev. 553, 572-77 (1974).
74. While discussing the Investor's Management Co. case, SEC Commissioner Loomis said
the following: "The Commission's idea of a highly specific information is a single concrete event
or determination or fact, as opposed to a mosaic of general information, some of which is public
and some of which isn't. Skillful assembly of a mosaic may lead an analyst to the conclusion that
the company's stock is going to go up or down a point. We are trying not to inhibit securities
research. That's one of the reasons why we refer to a specific event rather than the result of
research." Loomis on Inside Information, Financial Analysts J., May-June 1972, at 20, 25. See
also Gillis, Bausch & Lomb and Analytical Judgment, id., May-June 1972, at 10. The complaint
in SEC v. Avis, Inc. Civil No. 1065 (S.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 7, 1974), may appear to negate the
mosaic theory. Allegedly, the analyst included information from public sources and nonpublic
data from corporate sources. The question, however, is whether the information from the internal
sources was material. The mosaic concept presumes that the data from corporate sources is of a
non-material nature. One of the dangers in building mosaics and drawing seemingly logical
conclusions therefrom is that the mosaic builder may lack sufficient pieces and thereby obtain an
incorrect result.
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If internal corporate sources prove unhelpful, the analyst may turn
to external sources. These outside sources may also serve as a cross-
check on data gathered from management. For example, an analyst,
aware of a company's development of a new, simpler and faster
instant camera, and desirous of predicting its commercial success,
might well solicit information from a company official. Three problems
exist, however. Revelations by the corporate spokesman as to product
acceptance may constitute unusable material nonpublic information.
Even if the analyst feels justified in asking and management responds,
its response may not be completely candid. 75 Management, in addi-
tion, may refuse to comment at all.
The hypothetical analyst may then attempt to create his "mosaic" by
developing external sources. He will compare retail with wholesale
prices, survey the firm's labor demands, its advertising campaign, and
other external indicia of the company's commitment to, and the
public's acceptance of, the product. From this mosaic, the analyst will
draw his conclusions as to the product's probable commercial success
and will make his recommendations to clients.7 6
Responses to interviews and questionnaires indicated that security
analysts widely use the mosaic concept in reaching ultimate conclu-
sions. The legal question presented by the use of external sources is
whether, for instance, customers or suppliers of the corporation are
insiders, thereby rendering the analyst's data prohibited inside infor-
mation. Ascertaining product sales at one of many retail outlets is
distinguishable from eliciting the same information from the
company's sole retailer, which may be the equivalent of direct state-
ments by the corporation. Most firms are sensitive to this problem and
are beginning to formulate rudimentary guidelines for analysts. A
distinct minority feels external sources of any type are fair game. This
latter view may place such firms and analysts in a precarious position
with respect to rule 10b-5.
Here, as in the area of materiality, whether an outside information
source will be deemed an insider may be difficult for the preventative
attorney to determine. If the sole supplier case is clear, what if a
company purchases 16 percent or 33 percent of its requirements from a
given enterprise? We suggest that the more extraordinary the relation-
75. See R. Dirks & L. Gross, The Great Wall Street Scandal 126-34 (1974). Dirks contends
the information he received from the corporation itself was not material. Actually, this informa-
tion consisted of management denials of his independent conclusions. His "mosaic" led him to
believe that the corporate denial was unreliable and he passed his recommendation on to his
clients.
76. For an interesting account of the plight of the Polaroid Corporation, see Elia, Heard on
the Street, Wall St. J., July 3, 1974, at 21, col. 3; id., July 22, 1974, at.11, col. 1.
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ship between the corporation and the external source, the more
probable the latter will be viewed as an insider.7 7 Distance from the
corporation makes the information less meaningful and hence usually
is less sought after. Even if the analyst avoids clear violations, a gray
area enshrouds external sources and poses difficult day-to-day ques-
tions.
D. Confirnation
While the mosaic concept continues to be proffered by the invest-
ment community as an exception to rule 10b-5,7 8 analysts, after
gathering the basic information about the company from both internal
and external sources, commonly seek verification of the data and of the
77. See the concurring opinion of Commissioner Smith in Investors Management Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July 29, 1971). 11970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,163, at 80,523 ("The company source is what makes the information
'inside' and the special relationship (as director, employee, consultant, prospective underwriter,
etc.) is what creates the duty."). "The Rule does not apply to or prohibit communications with a
customer, supplier or competitor even though the information was material to another company.
unless an extraordinary, special relationship exists between the two companies, as in the case of a
sole supplier." New Guidelines on Inside Information, Financial Analysts J., Jan.-Feb. 1974. at
20, 24. The information possessed by the sole supplier for a company may be synonymous with
inside information since that supplier may be the only person who knows it. However, no special
relationship exists between competitors and the issuer. This proposed Financial Analysts Federa-
tion guideline has been rejected by the New York Society of Security Analysts because it
"expand[ed] the definition of insider through the back door in a way that could well foreclose on
much valuable public information." Financial Analysts Federation Guidelines as Modified by the
New York Society of Security Analysts received with materials from the Financial Analysts
Federation, which were submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to
Exchange Act Release No. 10316. See note 9 supra. The proposed ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1303(b)
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) defines insider to mean: "(1) the issuer, (2) a director, officer, parent,
subsidiary, or sister company of the issuer, (3) a person whose relationship to the issuer gives him
access to a fact of special significance about the issuer that is not generally available, or (4) a
person who learns such a fact from a person specified in this subsection (including a person
specified in this clause) with knowledge that the person from whom he learns the fact is such a
person, unless the Commission or a court finds that it would be inequitable, on consideration of
the circumstances and the purposes of this Code (including the deterrent effect of liabilities), to
treat the person specified in this clause as if he were specified in clause (1T (2), or (3)." See also
Loomis on Inside Information, Financial Analyst J., May-June, 1972, at 20, 25. ("If (an analyst),
as a result of his examination of all available public information and perhaps conversation with
suppliers and customers comes up with this [estimated earnings] information I would say he can
use it, provided it's a result of his analysis . -it's not something that anybody close to the
company has tipped him off to.").
78. "The Rule does not prohibit action resulting from the evaluation of nonpublic informa-
tion received from an insider, no one part of which is specific, material information, even though
such a conclusion if communicated by the company would be material." New Guidelines on
Inside Information, Financial Analyst J., Jan.-Feb. 1974, at 20, 23. The New York Society of
Security Analysts concurs without reservation. Id.
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analysts' conclusions with the company's representatives. In part, the
practice has arisen due to the penalties imposed upon analysts for
recommending a security without an adequate and reasonable basis.
The reasonable investigation requirement charges the analyst with
knowledge of reasonably ascertainable adverse information, thereby
encouraging him to perform the research as thoroughly as possible.
Research reports are checked by qualified supervisory personnel within
a brokerage firm to insure that a proper factual basis exists for any
conclusions and recommendations and that they are not subject to
misinterpretation. 7 9
79. Rules of various securities exchanges require supervisory personnel of brokerage firms to
check analysts' reports, including the firm's interest in such security or issuer, past recommenda-
tions, and hedge clauses. See, e.g., 2 CCH NYSE Guide 2472 (1970); SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 4593 (Apr. 10, 1951), 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 25,095.
In complying with the requirement of a reasonable investigation of the security and the issuer,
the analyst should obtain certain basic information regarding the security (number of shares
outstanding, average trading volume, current price and past price range) and the issuer (business
activities, officers, products, assets, financial condition, past and current earnings). See SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9239 (July 1, 1971), 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 22,760
(must include information regarding management, products, assets, earnings and financial
condition). A brokerage firm is deemed to have knowledge of reasonably adverse material
information which is reasonably available. The reasonableness of the investigation depends on
the speculative nature of the security and the number of customers involved. Hanly v. SEC, 415
F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969); see Levine v. SEC, 436 F.2d 88, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1971); Hiller v.
SEC, 429 F.2d 856, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1970); Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1967);
Floyd Earl O'Gorman, 43 S.E.C. 83, 85-86 (1966); Crow, Brourman & Chatkin, Inc., 42 S.E.C.
938, 943-44 (1966); Hamilton Waters & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7725
(Oct. 18, 1965), [1964-1965 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 77,298; Heft, Kahn &
Infante, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 379, 383 (1963); Investment Serv. Co., 41 S.E.C. 188, 195-96 (1962); SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721 (Feb. 2, 1962), 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 22,759,
See generally 1 Bromberg § 5.3; 2 id. § 8.4; E. Weiss, Registration and the Regulation of Brokers
and Dealers (1965); Brundy, Origins and Limited Applicability of the 'Reasonable Basis' or
'Know Your Merchandise Doctrine,' in Fourth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation 239
(1973); Jacobs, The Impact of Securities Exchange Rule 10b-5 on Broker-Dealers, 57 Cornell L.
Rev. 869, 881-97 (1972); Peloso, The Security Analyst, 7 Rev. Sec. Reg. 873 (Oct. 10, 1974).
For a discussion of claims of inadequacy of basis of recommendation by Merrill Lynch of
Scientific Control Stock, see In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 10233 (June 22, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
79,416; Wall St. J., June 25, 1973, at 2, col. 1.
See also Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (estimates of the earnings
projections in a prospectus must meet a standard of "high probability of realization"). If the
validity of the assumption underlying the projections is in doubt, causing a reasonably prudent
investor to be deterred from crediting the forecast, the assumption must be disclosed. Chairman
Garrett has found Beecher discouraging and expressed a preference for the lesser standards
imposed in Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.
1972) (forecasts should constitute fair and accurate reflection of carefully prepared documents that
reflect the best estimates of management and are reasonably believed by them). Addrss to
Financial Analysts Federation by Chairman Garrett (Apr. 29, 1974), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
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The analysts use confirmation in both mosaic and non-mosaic
situations. If, as a result of his mosaic, the analyst concludes that the
camera company previously alluded to is experiencing decreasing sales
which will result in an earnings downtrend, the analyst may ask the
corporation to confirm the magnitude of the earnings drop. At this
point, the analyst faces six possible responses: (1) a corporate
confirmation; (2) a corporate denial; (3) a corporate refusal to confirm
or deny; (4) a vague or ambiguous response; (5) a different (higher or
lower) earnings figure than that arrived at by the analyst; or (6) the
disclosure by the corporation of information that causes the analyst to
modify his conclusion.
Confirmation problems also may arise in non-mosaic instances. For
example, a drug firm may publicly announce the delay in construction
of a plant in Puerto Rico. The analyst may indicate to corporate
executives that earnings will decrease because certain tax benefits will
not be available. Upon confirmation of this conclusion, the analyst
may lower earnings estimates. Permitting confirmations by the analyst
may provide him with the very corporate information denied by the
Commission and the courts through more direct routes.
The less adequate the analyst's basis for his conclusion, the less
complete the mosaic, and the more it appears that the analyst is
improperly soliciting inside data from corporate sources. Applying the
converse of the "hang yourself' test of "materiality, "80 if the analyst
will not act on the data collected without confirmation, the Commis-
sion or private litigants may argue that the analyst has not completed
the mosaic. Furthermore, if the analyst changes his conclusion due to
the corporation's denials or its unwillingness to comment on a matter,
this may reveal the insufficiency of the research performed by the
analyst before seeking confirmation. An unethical management and
analyst may stage sham confirmations. 8
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. T 79,776. Earnings projections in certain industries, e.g., airlines, are
probably incapable of meeting the new standard. The standard for earnings projections is
probably applicable to estimates by security analysts. See generally SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5362 (Feb. 2, 1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. r 79,211;
Schneider, Financial Projections, 7 Rev. Sec. Reg. 907 (June 25, 1974); Schneider, Nits. Grits,
and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 254 (1972); Disclosure of Corporate
Forecast to the Investor, Financial Analysts Federation Monograph (Nov. 29, 1972) cLilley,
President of the Financial Analysts Federation); Grant, SEC Hearings on Forecasting Earnings,
Smith Barney Research Report (Dec. 7, 1972).
80. See note 57 supra.
81. When a company confirms a conclusion, it may be that the corroboration will merely
serve as a sham to permit the analyst to save the expense and time of complying with rule 10b-5.
Whether the analyst would truly go to the trouble of building a mosaic if an unfounded guess,
presented to a corporate executive as a conclusion, is actually verified by the executive should be
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To safeguard against such charges, at the very minimum, brokerage
firms should insist that analysts detail the bases for their conclusions
before seeking confirmation. This is an area where primary responsi-
bility should rest on the brokerage houses.8 2 In addition, to provide
some assurance of fair dealing, the analyst should seek verification
only of specific conclusions, e.g., a 20 percent drop in quarterly
earnings, rather than just a general earnings decline.
Closely allied with the question of confirmation is the practice of
analysts of submitting rough drafts of reports to corporate executives
and asking for corrections to insure the accuracy of the final product,
thus raising the specter of charges that the analyst is in management's
control or that management authored the report. 83 This type of
involvement must, of course, be avoided. However, it appears permis-
sible for the analyst to submit drafts and for the corporation, dealing
at arms-length with the analyst, to ask him to rephrase a statement or
indicate that certain information was disclosed to the analyst in
confidence and therefore should not be released.
E. The "Wall"
Several releases and cases have mandated the erection of a "wall" to
separate the investment banking, brokerage and research departments
considered. The issue raised in the SEC proceeding against Bausch & Lomb, Civil No. 2458
(S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1973), is whether the information involved resulted from a conclusion
generated by an analyst's mosaic, management's confirmation of an analyst's conclusion, or
information "tipped" by management to an analyst.
82. To place the burden on the corporation to check or screen an analyst's work product
before verifying a conclusion is unreasonable. The outside source, if an "extraordinary" relation-
ship exists, may well constitute an insider for the purposes of improper confirmation. See note 77
supra. See also the suggestion of Richard Jennings in Jennings & Smith, supra note 58, at 280
(analyst should advise company that he will release information and if corporation has any
questions, it should issue its own press release).
83. The analyst should, wherever possible, avoid a corporate spokesman publicly quoting
from a research report in meetings with the press or other analysts for fear it might result In
allegations of impropriety. See Report from D. Clurman, Ass't Att'y Gen., Director, Bureau of
Sec. & Pub. Financing to Hon. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Att'y Gen. of the State of New York, An
Inquiry under Article 23-A General Business Law, into the Offering and Trading of Stock in
Levitz Furniture Corporation; Abelson, Up and Down Wall Street, Barron's, Apr. 22, 1974, at
25, col. 5 (stating that an investigation was being initiated by the New York State Attorney
General's Office into analysts' relations with corporate executives). "Among other things the
probe hopes to uncover the sources analysts use for their information (besides the Wall Street
Journal); what brokerage houses expect from their analysts (commissions, maybe?); what supervi-
sion they are subject to; what means are used to influence analysts by grubby corporate types
(besides calling them by their first name, we expect); the uses to which analysts put information
they receive (we can answer that one-they invariably use it to make bad recommendations, but,
so far as we know, that's still legal even in New York)." Id. at 26, col. 4.
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of brokerage firms.84 In response to our inquiry to determine what
measures had been taken by firms to separate these departments,
seven firms stated that a "wall" had been erected to discourage the
infiltration of inside information, especially between the investment
banking and the research departments. Surprisingly, these policies,
where in force, were not embodied in written form. Three firms
indicated that no walls existed between research, investment banking
and brokerage sections.8 5 Two of these houses flatly stated that they
believed recent court decisions would make the barrier approach
unworkable since information possessed by one area of an organization
has been held to be imputed to the firm as a whole. 86 The other firm
had established barriers among functional areas but kept department
heads aware of material data uncovered by other sectors so that
recommendations could be properly supervised. Our research also
uncovered close contact and cooperation between the analysts and
institutional salesmen within a firm. About half of the responses
indicated no concern over the flow of information between the broker-
84. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8459 (Nov. 25, 1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep- 77.629 (con-ent
decree entered into arising out of dissemination of insider information received by virtue of its
position as underwriter for Douglas Aircraft. The settlement the SEC obtained from Merrill
Lynch included a Statement of Policy (Exhibit A to the Release) that inside information obtained
by the underwriting department of the firm would be sealed in such department and not released
to anyone outside the department, subject to certain exceptions); Investors Management Co-,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July 29, 1971). [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 78,163. In Investors Management Co., the Commission stated, "We
consider it appropriate to observe that in future cases we would view as suspect and subject to
close scrutiny a defense that there was no internal communication of material non-public
information and its source by a member of a broker-dealer firm or other investment organization
who received it, where a transaction of the kind indicated by it was effected by his organization
immediately or closely thereafter. A showing of such receipt and transaction prior to the time the
information became public should in itself constitute strong evidence of knowledge by the one
who effected the transaction and by the firm." Id. at 80,522 n.28. See also Shapiro v Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 US. 874 (1973)1
85. Interviews with smaller firms illustrated the difficulty such houses faced in maintaining a
"wall" since a single individual may function in several areas. In addition, some firms recognized
a need for close relationships between various departments, which makes formal policy difficult
to enforce. Except for crisis situations, these firms indicated that general information passed
between or among various departments. See also Herman & Safanda, The Commercial Bank
Trust Department and the "Wall," 14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 21, 37 (1972).
86. An obvious reference to Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder)
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,329 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), certification granted. 11973-1974 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,439 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1974), remanded for further
findings of fact, [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,914 (2d Cir., Dec. 16. 1974); sc
Bernstein, Beyond Texas Gulf, 169 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 28, 1974, at 1, col. 1; 27 Vand. L Rev 815
(1974); Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
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age and research departments.8 7 Only several questionnaires and
interviewees stated that an informal policy existed regarding the
placement of a barrier between research and brokerage departments.
The key point overlooked by the firms surveyed is the need, if an
analyst comes into possession of material nonpublic information, to
contain such information within the research department until the
house decides how to handle the situation. Firms must develop an
increased sensitivity to this problem.
The impact of Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co. 8 may lead to the
abandonment of walls erected as part of compliance programs of
brokerage houses operating in more than one functional area. The
practical problem presented by the case can be illustrated simply. The
research arm of a firm has for some time issued favorable recommen-
dations regarding a corporation. The investment banking department
of the firm in performing services for such issuer-for instance,
underwriting or private placement-ascertains material adverse in-
formation of a nonpublic nature. In light of Slade, the firm's research
department must cease recommending the stock as well as abstain
from trading for its own account or making a market in the issuer's
securities. Stated differently, where a brokerage firm acts in more than
one functional area, its research staff may only prepare and dissemi-
nate written factual reports without any comments, conclusions or
recommendations. On the brokerage side, registered representatives in
such situations must also be advised not to comment on or recommend
the stock. If the investment banking department possesses inside
information, several difficult situations from the viewpoint of salesmen
and clients ensue. A customer who does not hold the security may call
87. The situation is exacerbated by house policies making analyst advancement dependent
not only on the good will of senior analysts and supervisors of the research department, but also
on the good will of the firm's institutional salesmen who generate the life-blood of the
firm-brokerage commissions. The firms emphasize, as a selling point, the availability of their
analysts to discuss with institutional clients the analysts' views regarding an issuer. An analyst
learns that promotions come faster and easier (or at least job security is maintained) if he provides
the salesmen and key institutional clients with subtle shifts in the analyst's opinions and changes
in conclusions. In this environment, the potential and the motivation for tipping of Inside
information or conveying market information does exist.
88. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. V 94,329 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
certification granted, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,439 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 18, 1974), remanded for further findings of fact, [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. T
94,914 (2d Cir., Dec. 16, 1974); Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72
Cal. Rptr. 157 (1st Dist. 1968). See also Poser & Aronson, Conflicts of Duty, 2 Rev. Sec. Reg. 825
(1969); Poser, American Stock Exchange Information Circular No. 28-71 (Mar. 8, 1971); Jacobs,
The Impact of Securities Exchange Act Rule lob-5 on Broker-Dealers, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 869,
971 (1972). See generally Lipton, Rule 10b-5: The End of Isolation and New Thresholds of
Materiality, Sixth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation 326-45 (1974); Note, Conflicting
Duties of Brokerage Firms, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 396 (1974).
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a salesman and elicit his opinion on the issue. The registered represen-
tative is not free to comment on the security. The customer then buys
the stock, which drops precipitously. The firm faces a possible suit
from a disgruntled customer. On the other hand, a registered represen-
tative may have previously advised a client to buy the stock. The
client subsequently calls and the representative advises him he can no
longer comment on the stock (again the investment banking depart-
ment is privy to materially adverse inside information but the regis-
tered representative suspects that the issuer is in trouble and probably
wishes to get his customers out of the stock). The issue plummets,
exposing the firm to liability, even in the absence of trading by the
customer, for failure to make full disclosure to its customers.8 9 In
short, how should the brokerage firm handle clients in the face of the
house's knowledge of materially adverse inside information?
Brokerage firms may handle the problem in at least four possible
ways. First, supervisory personnel may keep abreast of material data
known to other functional areas, so that recommendations by the
research and brokerage sides are properly supervised. If a firm's
investment banking department ascertains material nonpublic infor-
mation, the data should be sealed in such department and the firm's
research and brokerage sides should abstain from making any recom-
mendation regarding the issuer's securities. The easier course is for a
firm to place a security on a restricted list and withdraw a recommen-
dation when the house enters into an investment banking relationship
with a corporation (and prior to the receipt of any material nonpublic
information) and thereafter, throughout the duration of the investment
banking relationship, to make no further recommendations and pro-
hibit its registered representatives from recommending the security.
The withdrawal of the recommendation at this point probably may be
89. A narrow reading of the tippee cases makes this argument appear invalid. No financial
advisor is permitted to correct earlier recommendations, true when made, but now miseading,
when the only means of correction is to tip inside information of a material nature. See notes
22-24 supra. The firm owes a duty to its investment banking clients to preserve the confidentiality
of material nonpublic information disclosed to it. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 823-24 (2d Cir.
1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386
(1974). withdrawal of a recommendation, after receipt of materially adverse inside information,
may expose a firm to liability to both its investment banking client and its brokerage clients. See
the complaint brought by SEC against Bausch & Lomb, Inc., Civil No. 2458 (S.D.N.Y. June 4,
1973).
Eventually, as in the case of softened recommendations (see note 49 supra), a refusal to
comment will become recognized as a "pat phrase" admission of the possession of material
nonpublic information. Whether or not the firm has an advisory relationship with its customer,
the house cannot disclose the inside information. If the recommendation is changed to be
consistent with the inside information, the firm engages in tipping. If the firm continues to make
recommendations contrary to the inside information secured by its investment department,
liability ensues under the Slade decision.
1975]
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accomplished without creating any inferences regarding the receipt of
material nonpublic information of a positive or adverse nature. This
course enables the firm to perform its brokerage functions even if the
investment banking department has material nonpublic information.
However, the firm, after the establishment of the investment banking
relationship, but prior to the receipt of material nonpublic informa-
tion, may continue to disseminate recommendations. When the firm's
investment banking department secures material nonpublic informa-
tion, the firm may cease making recommendations, but continue to
execute brokerage transactions in the issuer's securities. This latter
course, however, poses the problem, considered above, of exposure to
suits by clients stemming from the withdrawal of the recommendation
and the refusal of the salesman to comment. Secondly, the firm might
pressure the issuer to disclose the information. However, corporations
may not desire speedy public dissemination of materially adverse
information. Thirdly, the brokerage firm itself might make the disclos-
ure, thus presenting a difficult liability question with reference to the
firm's fiduciary duties to the issuer. Finally, if the brokerage depart-
ment is executing transactions while the investment banking side is
also serving the corporation, the firm might choose to perform only one
of the functions. Although cutting the firm's revenue sources, this
course appears to solve the problems regarding conflicting fiduciary
obligations and possible violations of rule 10b-5. The financial
difficulties faced by the brokerage industry, perhaps, renders the first
alternative (that is, placing a security on a restricted list and withdraw-
ing any recommendation and preventing further recommendations
when the firm enters into an investment banking relationship) the most
suitable for firms in need of income streams from both the investment
banking and brokerage sides.
F. Market Impact
Firms having a major market position or expertise in relation to an
industry, or even one company, face a final problem-namely, the
impact of information which may have a material effect on the market
for and the price of a security, but which does not emanate from the
issuer. 90 Wall Street sources stated that market impact problems
90. The initial Commission proceeding based on market information was brought against
Sorg Printing Co., SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,767
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1974); Wall St. J., May 22, 1974, at 9, col. 2; see Financial Columnist
Agrees to Injunction Against "Further" Securities Violations, id., Oct. 24, 1974, at 8, col. 3
(injunction by SEC against Alex N. Campbell. Action alleged fraud based on market informa-
tion). See also SEC v. Campbell, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,580
(C.D. Cal. 1972). A private suit, Birdman v. Electro-Catheter Corp., 352 F: Supp. 1271 (ED.
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encountered by securities professionals9' can best be viewed on three
levels: the analyst's response to institutional investor questions while
he is in the process of his factual inquiry and preparation of his report;
methods of disseminating the final research product; and the handling
of block positioning. Concern must be focused on forces generated by
securities professionals which may produce a price impact. 92
The market impact question flows out of the overwhelming reliance
of the leading brokerage firms on institutional customers, which are
cultivated assiduously in part by making such clients feel that they can
freely contact analysts to discuss specific securities they follow or
general market trends. The institutional client may simply ask the
analyst about recent developments in general; ask about a corporation
generally or about a specific development; or solicit information re-
garding a report the analyst is preparing on a corporation. The analyst
may respond to such inquiries in a variety of ways. Queries regarding
earnings may result in the analyst's giving his opinion about earnings,
subject to the qualification that he plans to confirm his figures with the
company. As the analyst's report proceeds to completion, the analyst
may admit that he is preparing a report and convey his preliminary
conclusion. Although the leading firms increasingly are sensitive to the
Pa. 1973), held that the defendant had an obligation to disclose in the future market impact
information, if material. Failure to do so would thwart the basic policy of rule lob-S. The
rationale for the parity of information standard is that the effect to the investing public is the
same whether the issuer's shares decline in price as a result of misuse of inside corporate
information or decline in price as a result of general market information. See Upton, Market
Information, Fifth Annual Institute on Securities Regulations 287, 290-97 (1974); ALl Fed. Sec.
Code § 1303, Comment (2) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973). The following statement by the chief trial
counsel, N.Y. Regional Office, Securities and Exchange Commission, summarizes the reasoning
behind the market impact concept: "Conceptually, therefore, section 10(b) should apply whenever
any person trades on or disseminates information which is material to an investment decision and
is not public but should be, or is about to be. The character of the information . . . about a
corporation's financial statements, its operations or future plans, should be relevant only as to its
materiality. There need be no requirement, however, that the information acted upon or
disseminated, have concerned these matters. Indeed, there should be no requirement that it even
emanates from within the issuer as long as the information can be reasonably calculated to affect
the market price of the security traded." Peloso, SEC Rule 10b-5 and Outside Information, 168
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1972, at 32, col. 3. Analysis of market information will involve the SEC and
the courts in questions of materiality based on the reputation of analysts. See also Elia, "Heard
on the Street," Wali St. J., May 31, 1974, at 31, col. 3 (market impact of unfavorable research
reports by prominent institutionally oriented brokerage firms).
91. For analytical precision assume the analyst's information comes only from public sources
and neither the analyst nor the firm undertakes transactions for his or its own account on the
basis of such information.
92. Numerous other market impact problems of concern to analysts may occur, e.g., when
the brokerage firm establishes its own market position before publication of its report, or changes
prior recommendations. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the
Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 800-02 (1973)
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problem of selective dissemination to institutional clients of informa-
tion or opinions of analysts, these factual patterns constitute daily
occurrences within the brokerage industry.
The following practical guidelines are suggested to handle such
problems. If the institution calls prior to the analyst's having made the
confirmation, the analyst should indicate he can only comment after
such verification. Upon confirmation, if the matter is non-material, the
analyst might respond to inquiries. If it is material, but the firm does
not wish to make public dissemination, the analyst should avoid
disclosure of his conclusion to the client. It also is recommended that
the analyst not disclose preliminary research findings until the report is
in final form and ready for distribution through normal channels. 9 3
As research reports may trigger price changes in an issuer's security,
the means of disseminating such reports are critical. Ideally, the broker
should deal fairly with all customers. 94 Firms with branch offices state
that they simultaneously send the substance of a recommendation by
wire to all offices with instructions to divulge the conclusion to all
salesmen, both institutional and retail, at the same time. Within the
firm, this procedure avoids the problems of simultaneous telephone
calls and postal delays. However, firms stated that institutional sales-
men contact clients in order of their relative economic importance. In
an era of negotiated commission rates, perhaps customers paying a
higher price for deluxe services should receive preferential treatment in
the dissemination of information. To avoid potential liabilities, it may
prove safer for the firm to instruct salesmen to rotate the order in
which they contact institutional clients so as to avoid favoritism. 95
93. Market information problems lie on the frontiers of rule lob-5 calling for doctrinal
developments to elucidate the issues further. See Courtland v. Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (dissemination of market letters successfully attacked).
94. Recommendations should be disseminated in a manner which will be consistent with the
broker-dealer's obligation to deal fairly with all its customers. Butcher & Sherrerd, SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9894 (Dec. 11, 1972), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,135. See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8459 (Nov. 25, 1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L,
Rep. 77,629; Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to
Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 835-40 (1973). Dissemination requirements
relate to the substance of the recommendation and not to the amount of underlying detail
provided with it, because various types and classes of investors may want or require differing
amounts of detail. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, Disclosure of Investment Advice, 6
Rev. Sec. Reg. 867 (1973). Firms should maintain safeguards to prevent leakage of reports
before official distribution. Wall St. J., July 6, 1973, at 7, col. 1.
95. However, no case suggests that each client must be informed of every recommendation in
the same way. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, Disclosure of Investment Advice, 6 Rev.
Sec. Reg. 867, 871 n.21 & 22 (1973). See also Wall St. J., July 6, 1973, at 7, col. 1 (lealkage of
analyst report prior to official distribution).
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Block positioning presents a final difficult area regarding market
impact. Registered block positioners are member firms who facilitate
client transactions by taking for the firm's account all or any portion of
a block which cannot otherwise be disposed of 9 6 In undertaking such
transactions, the firm usually values the block of shares at a discount
below current market price. When the firm then approaches a prospec-
tive institutional purchaser, it discloses the existence of such an
overhanging block and the price discount. The firm and such institu-
tions contacted thus possess material market information resulting
*from the knowledge of supply and demand forces. 9
7
The rules of the New York Stock Exchange designate certain
persons who may not personally benefit from information involving a
trade of 5000 or more shares. 98 Exceptions are prescribed, however, to
facilitate other transactions and to serve the public. The Commission
and the New York Stock Exchange have not eliminated the informa-
tional advantages of block positioners, specifically relating to supply
and demand, which accrue from their very function and location in the
securities market. 99 In light of this policy, which appears soundly
based, firms should continue present block positioning practices.
VI. REFORM
The basic disclosure policies of rule 10b-5 are founded on the
principle that parties to securities transactions should have equal
access to information. 0 0 This contributes to public confidence in the
securities markets by attempting to insure that all investors receive fair
treatment. Honest conduct in the market, it is hoped, will promote the
economic good of the nation. The extension of liability to tippees flows
96. A similar problem exists for market-makers. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy,
Disclosure of Investment Advice, 6 Rev. Sec. Reg. 867, 869 (1973).
97. Lipton, Market Information, Fifth Annual Institute on Securities Regulations 217, 242-44
(1973). Additional problems exist with regard to disclosure of the block positioner's inventory and
future price intentions, and disclosure of the block positioner's knowledge of other investor's
intentions.
98. See NYSE Rule 112.10(b), 2 CCH NYSE Guide T 2112.10 (1972).
99. See Report of ABA Subcommittee on Rule 10b-5 and Subcommittee on Broker-Dealer
Matters to the SEC, BNA Sec. Reg. Rep. No. 233, at D-1 to D-6 (Jan. 2, 1974) [hereinafter cited
as ABA Report]. See also Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the
Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 847-58 (1973). However,
if market information need only be disclosed when a special relationship between the parties
creates an independent duty to disclose (see Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); remarks of Stanley Sporkin, Fifth Annual Institute on Securities
Regulation 303-04 (1973), does not knowledge, for instance, of the overhanging block constitute a
special relationship? If such information "gets out" to other firms such a relationship may no
longer exist.
100. See 3 Bromberg § 12.2; note 103 infra.
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from a desire to bolster the expectation of confidentiality acquired from
various relationships with issuer corporations. 10 1 Despite the unani-
mous acceptance of this rationale by the Commission and the courts,
should the entire policy basis underpinning rule 10b-5 be reevaluated?
The economist postulates that an efficient stock market should quickly
reflect changes in corporate conditions. 10 2 The flow of information
from the corporation to the market produces prompt price adjustments
in response to corporate developments. In a soundly functioning
market a minimum number of trades should exist between price
adjustments.
It might be argued that permitting the analyst to receive material
nonpublic information from corporate sources and pass it on might
serve the public interest. For instance, information regarding fraud or
mismanagement, if conveyed by the analyst to his clients, facilitates
price changes in light of such developments. If a company plans to
make such disclosure in two weeks, but the analyst obtains the data
now which is then acted on by his clients, the price adjustment process
is hastened. Otherwise, such information will not be reflected in the
price for two weeks, thereby causing the public to pay inflated prices
not accurately reflecting corporate developments. Such a system would
additionally promote an incentive for the diligent analyst. The ability
to obtain inside information would be rewarded handsomely by com-
missions accruing to the analyst's firm. If the analyst cannot use this
inside information, he may not be as diligent in his search. 103
101. ABA Report.
102. See generally, W. Baumol, The Stock Market and Economic Efficiency (1965);
Economic Policy and Regulation of Corporate Securities (H. Manne ed. 1969); Benston, Required
Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Am.
Eco. Rev. 132, 137 (1973); Kassouf, Towards a Legal Framework for Efficiency and Equity in
the Securities Markets, 25 Hastings L.J. 417 (1974); Robbins & Werner, Professor Stigler
Revisited, 37 J. Bus. 406 (1964); Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus.
117 (1964).
103. The policy reasons of developing a "fairness" standard based on the need for incentives
are weighty. "Analytically such a fairness approach reflects an attempt to balance at least two
considerations which are central to regulation of securities markets. The securities law seeks to
foster public investment by promoting confidence in the securities markets. Elimination of
disparities in information available to participants in the trading markets has been an important
part of the program to maintain public confidence. At the same time the federal securities laws
also seek to enhance the efficiency of the securities markets as an allocator of resources. Prompt
disclosure is important to that aim. In addition, sufficient incentives must exist to encourage the
digging out of information and careful and imaginative analyses of the available information."
Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, Disclosure of Investment Advice, 6 Rev. Sec. Reg. 807,
809-19 (1973). See also Lipton, Market Information, Fifth Annual Institute on Securities
Regulations 217, 220 (1973) (indicating the trend toward parity of information ultimately will
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This is, however, not a novel argument.' 0 4 In evaluating the
trade-off between fairness, on the one hand, and the most efficiently
functioning stock market and entrepreneurial rewards on the other,
the balance has been struck in favor of equal access. It seems likely
that the Commission and courts will continue to adhere to such a
position. However, despite attempts to equalize access to information,
it should be noted that clients of different firms have varying informa-
tional positions relative to the analytic skill and judgment of the
research department and its resources.' 05
The Commission should promulgate guidelines confirming sound
industry practices and clarifying uncertainties. Areas of specific con-
cern suitable for such standards include: contacts by analysts with
corporations, mosaics and verification. First, the Commission should
sanction direct contacts between analysts and corporate management
to obtain non-material information.' 0 6 Although these encounters
would increase the likelihood that inside information may pass to
analysts, it is hoped that these contacts would provide additional data
upon which the analysts could exercise their investment skills.
Secondly, the Commission should explicitly permit the building of
mosaics. The security analyst, exercising judgment and expertise,
accumulates information so as to develop a model of the company. His
emerge as the legal standard). One Wall Street professional characterized the trend for economic
egalitarianism in terms of "to each according to his need, from each according to his ability-"
104. Essentially the theory is founded on the premise that entrepreneurs and quality execu-
tives should be rewarded through recourse to insider trading. See H. Manne, Insider Trading and
the Stock Market (1966); Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors. 23 Vand. L, Rev 547
& n.2 (1970).
105. Although securities professionals might like the public and regulators to believe that
compliance with rule 10b-5 is unnecessarily costly, the contrary is probabl> true Two firms
estimated their costs approached $40,000 and $50,000, respectively. Most houses could not gve
estimates, but discussed factors they would consider in arriving at such a figure, including legal
expenses, attorney's fees, supervisory personnel, as well as the time involved for all personnel to
keep abreast of changes in the law. One interviewee suggested that the real cost of compliance
couched in this framework was nearly nothing. Compliance personnel would be necessary in an,
house to delineate the scope of the regulatory framework, and rule lob-5 would be just another
area on a compliance staff's agenda. A real cost generally not computed by brokerage firms is the
commission volume that could be generated if inside information could be conveyed to customers.
especially institutional investors.
106. New Guidelines on Inside Information, Financial Analyst J., Jan.-Feb 1974. at 20
Especially note both former Chairman Casey's and former Chairman Cook's comments at 23
Presently many larger companies have officers whose only job is to meet with analysis and
answer their questions. This contact would hardly provide as good a "feel" for the operation of
management affairs as would a meeting with those who actual> formulate polic. and make
decisions.
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analysis culminates in an ultimate conclusion which is then dissemi-
nated to clients, 10 7 thus permitting the price of an issuer's securities to
more accurately reflect corporate developments. Analysts should be
permitted to construct and cross-check mosaics by contacting sources
both internal and external to the corporation.
Thirdly, the Commission should sanction the analysts' confirming
their conclusions with corporate management. To avoid sham
verification situations, supervisory personnel of brokerage houses
should be responsible for reviewing analysts' work products prior to
corporate confirmation. Guidelines might also be generated as to the
types of items analysts generally should include in a mosaic before
attempting verification. 10 8
Additional study must be undertaken before the Commission prom-
ulgates standards regarding the multitude qf market impact problems,
and the flow of information between different departments in a firm
serving an issuer and at the same time recommending securities of
such corporation to customers. In view of the brokerage industry's
current struggle for survival, rules which effectively force the splitting
of firms into separate entities with distinctly different functions seem
economically unsound. The industry argues that the legal standards
developed in the Slade decision' 0 9 may place certain firms at a
competitive disadvantage because clients may perceive a house as
incompetent when it is unable to express recommendations in certain
situations. An additional question raised is whether the firm owes its
ultimate fiduciary obligation, in such instances, to its customers or the
issuer which it also serves. 110
Attempting to delineate guidelines for materiality and to classify
107. The SEC could devise guidelines to assure that information is rotated to different clients
within the class seeking that type of information. See note 94 supra.
108. We conclude that sound policy reasons exist for the imposition of liability on broker-
dealers who make recommendations based upon insufficient information. See note 79 supra. But
note the opposite position of Stanley Sporkin, Fifth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation
277-78 (1973) ("What is the difference between a company not raising by red flags on an analyst's
projection of $1.80 per share and the company telling the analyst that the earnings are going to be
$1.80? I don't think the fact that somebody did a little bit of homework means that he should be
able to go to management and say: 'We have come in Mr. President, with $1.80. Are we in the
ballpark?' It seems to me that the response he is getting in [sic] material information and he is
therefore precluded from trading."
109. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
94,329 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), certification granted, (1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. T 94,439 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1974), remanded for further findings of fact, [Current Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,914 (2d Cir. Dec. 16, 1974).
110. See note 89 supra. See also ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1303(bX4), Comment 67(b) (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1973).
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sources of information external to the corporation which fall within the
extraordinary relationship definition of an insider appear to be exer-
cises in futility for even the most able scholars"' and a waste of the
Commission's time and money. Definitive determinations of material-
ity and extraordinary relationships must be rendered on an ad hoc
basis. What is material is subject to and varies with time and a variety
of factors among industries and corporations. The Commission could
mandate that the analyst may not contact a corporation's sole supplier
or customer. In addition, it could select an arbitrary cut-off figure,
permitting the analyst to contact suppliers if more than five in number.
However, one supplier might occupy a preeminent position and
another might provide a critical product or material, thus making such
a numbers game a palliative of little permanent value.
Apart from changes in verbal formulations and the development of
more precise guidelines, we recommend a twofold program: increased
pressure for more corporate disclosure and the establishment of a
no-action telephone system by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. The analyst feels the weight of the Commission because of its
regulatory jurisdiction over broker-dealers under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.112 The Commission can reach security analysts
more easily than corporations and their executives in trying to solve
the inside information problem. Following the disclosure guidelines of
the New York Stock Exchange" 3 we suggest that the Securities and
111. See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 256 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973). This section is devoid of
specifics. If so eminent a scholar as Professor Louis Loss can do no more than deal in generalities,
it is unlikely any written standards can be devised to seriously guide action in the "gray areas."
See Painter, Rule 10b-5: The Recodification Thicket, 45 St. John's L. Rev. 699 (1971). Regarding
the definition of "insider" see remarks by Stanley Sporkin, in Fifth Annual Institute on Securities
Regulation 267 (1973). "For that reason, I would certainly think it possible to find a theory under
which information obtained from suppliers or distributors would be included in 'inside informa-
tion.' If information cannot be obtained directly from the company, I do not see how it becomes
acceptable to go to 50 distributors and get the same kind of information. I simply do not believe
that that concept is going to fly."
112. See generally E. Weiss, Registration and Regulation of Brokers and Dealers (1965).
113. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra."We do not suggest that material facts must be
disclosed immediately; the timing of disclosure is a matter for the business judgment of the
corporate officers entrusted with the management of the corporation within the affirmative
disclosure requirements promulgated by the exchanges and by the SEC." SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
See also SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5092 (Oct. 15, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 77,915 (Commission reiterated the need for publicly held
companies to make prompt and accurate disclosure of information, both favorable and unfavora-
ble, to security holders and the investing public). But see Feuerstein, The Corporation's
Obligations of Disclosure Under the Federal Securities Laws When It Is Not Trading in Its
1975] RULE 10b-5
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Exchange Commission mandate prompt and continuous disclosure of
all material corporate information, even in the absence of any insider
or tippee transactions. This proposal should be contrasted with current
management disclosure procedures which in many cases may prove
inadequate or incomplete. An example of quarterly disclosure illus-
trates the problem. At the beginning of a quarterly period, manage-
ment, as part of its regular program of public quarterly dissemination,
states that earnings are projected to rise by ten percent during such
time frame. At the conclusion of the quarter, management announces
that earnings, in fact, declined 25 percent. During the quarter, a
certain event or events occurred rendering the forecast inaccurate.
Rather than waiting to the end of such period, management, after
proper verification, should publicly state that business is not progress-
ing as well as had been anticipated, the forecast will not be met, and
the reasons therefor.
Continuous corporate disclosure would assist the analyst and re-
move part of the temptation to seek inside information. Such dissemi-
nation would promote a more efficient stock market by producing
more accurate responses to events actually occurring within the
corporation. 1 14
Even if the Commission were to clarify questions regarding corpo-
rate contacts, and mosaic, and verification, the application of these
guidelines together with unresolved gray area problems involving
materiality and the boundaries of the extraordinary relationship test
must be handled in a manner different from the present retrospective,
ad hoc interpretations by the Commission and courts. When con-
fronted with a difficult question, or perhaps even a fairly obvious one,
a no-action telephone system would enable securities professionals to
contact the Commission and obtain an administrative opinion as to a
proposed course of action. Conduct taken in accordance with such
administrative advice would alleviate the industry's concern regarding
Commission enforcement action, at least to the extent such assurances
are available under the current written no-action method.'- The
Stock, 15 N.Y.L.F. 385 (1969) (maintaining that timely disclosure should be required through
self-regulatory agencies). But how effective is the New York Stock Exchange or American Stock
Exchange in policing their requirements?
114. Even if continuous disclosure is not required some guidelines should be promulgated to
enable smaller corporations to achieve adequate public dissemination. ABA Report, supra note
100, at D-3.
115. See Lockhart, SEC No-Action Letters: Informal Advice as a Discretionary Administra-
tive Clearance, 37 Law & Contemp. Prob. 95 (1972). For a discussion regarding an administra-
tive agency's duty to provide standards and safeguards by rule-making or policy statements
wherever feasible, see K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 6.13 (Supp. 1970); Friendly, The
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system would also provide the Commission with a continuous flow of
current data concerning rule 10b-5 problems arising in day-to-day
operations of the industry, to be used as a research data base for future
policy making changes regarding the rule.
This no-action telephone system has several immediate shortcom-
ings that must be resolved prior to implementation. The system
mandates record keeping machinery to preserve the telephone conver-
sations. Permanent tape recordings may be appropriate. Written
confirmation by mail or telegram of both the factual problem conveyed
and the opinion rendered may constitute an alternative solution.
Although this system lacks the speed requisite for activities of the
securities professionals, it might reduce divergencies between the
Commission's interpretation of the factual pattern as discussed and the
nuances of the staff response. Written confirmation, when used in
conjunction with the simultaneous recording of telephone discussions,
would prove viable and would provide the basis for further adminis-
trative review, and if necessary, judicial review,' 16 or possible en-
forcement proceedings by the Commission if action contrary to the
Commission's opinion were to be taken.
From the Commission's standpoint two major problems must be
assessed: money and manpower, and the ability to provide prompt
responses. The Commission appears to be moving away from reliance
on the no-action letter system, as manifested by the promulgation of
Rule 144,117 stemming, in large measure, from staffing problems.
However, the suggested plan need not deplete Commission resources
or burden the taxpayer. If the brokerage industry desires this system,
it is only equitable that firms bear the cost. The precedent for
providing services funded by industry sources is not unfounded. It is
precisely such a special surcharge that funds the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation." 8
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117. Rule 144 was proposed in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5687 (Sept 22. 1970).
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Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972). [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed Sec L Rep
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Even if adequately funded and staffed, could the system generally
provide the desired prompt response? Repetitive problems could be
speedily disposed of. The strain of resolving difficult gray area ques-
tions might prod the Commission to develop guidelines where possible,
or else allow the hot-line staff to collectively resolve such questions in
the absence of clear-cut standards.
